JMAP Web Push VAPID: Use of Voluntary Application Server Identification (VAPID) in JSON Meta Application Protocol (JMAP) Web Push
How a JMAP server advertises the VAPID key that authenticates its Web Push notifications.
Gultsch, D., "Use of Voluntary Application Server Identification (VAPID) in JSON Meta Application Protocol (JMAP) Web Push", RFC 9749, DOI 10.17487/RFC9749, March 2025, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9749>.
@misc{rfc9749,
series = {Request for Comments},
number = 9749,
howpublished = {RFC 9749},
publisher = {RFC Editor},
doi = {10.17487/RFC9749},
url = {https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9749},
author = {D. Gultsch},
title = {{Use of Voluntary Application Server Identification (VAPID) in JSON Meta Application Protocol (JMAP) Web Push}},
pagetotal = 5,
year = 2025,
month = mar,
} RFC text
Contents
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) D. Gultsch
Request for Comments: 9749 March 2025
Category: Standards Track
ISSN: 2070-1721
Use of Voluntary Application Server Identification (VAPID) in JSON Meta
Application Protocol (JMAP) Web Push
Abstract
This document defines a method for JSON Meta Application Protocol
(JMAP) servers to advertise their capability to authenticate Web Push
notifications using the Voluntary Application Server Identification
(VAPID) protocol.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9749.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Conventions Used in This Document
3. Discovering Support for VAPID
4. Issuing Push Notifications
5. Key Rotation
6. Security Considerations
7. IANA Considerations
7.1. Registration of the JMAP Capability for VAPID
8. References
8.1. Normative References
8.2. Informative References
Author's Address
1. Introduction
JMAP [RFC8620] specifies how clients can subscribe to events using a
protocol that is compatible with Web Push [RFC8030]. Some push
services require that the application server authenticate all push
messages using the VAPID protocol [RFC8292]. To facilitate that, the
client (or user agent in Web Push terminology) needs the VAPID public
key of the application server to pass along to the push service when
retrieving a new endpoint.
2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Discovering Support for VAPID
The JMAP capabilities object is returned as part of the standard JMAP
session object (see Section 2 of [RFC8620]). Servers supporting this
specification MUST add a property called
urn:ietf:params:jmap:webpush-vapid to the capabilities object. The
value of this property is an object that MUST contain the following
information:
applicationServerKey: "String"
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) public key
that the push service will use to authenticate the application
server, in its uncompressed form (as described in Section 2.3.3 of
[SEC1]) and encoded using base64url encoding [RFC7515]. Current
systems use the P-256 curve [FIPS186].
| Informative Note: The format of the application server key was
| chosen to ensure compatibility with the browser API
| (Section 7.2 of [PUSH-API]), allowing the key to be directly
| copied and used without additional transformation.
| Additionally, as noted in Section 3.2 of [RFC8292], the X9.62
| encoding (which is compatible with SEC1 encoding) simplifies
| key comparisons and is more compact than alternative formats.
4. Issuing Push Notifications
Every time the server sends a push message to a PushSubscription URL,
it MUST authenticate the POST request using the protocol outlined in
[RFC8292]. This includes both StateChange events and
PushVerification notifications. To authenticate the request, the
server MUST use a JSON Web Token (JWT) signed by the private key
corresponding to the application server key. This application server
key MUST be the one that was advertised in the capabilities object at
the time the PushSubscription was created.
5. Key Rotation
When a server needs to replace its VAPID key, it MUST update the
sessionState per [RFC8620]. The client MUST monitor the JMAP session
object for changes to the VAPID key and MUST recreate its push
subscription when it detects such a change.
After key rotation, the server MAY continue to send push
notifications for existing push subscriptions using the old
application server key for a transitional period. This allows
clients time to recreate their respective push subscriptions. At the
end of the transitional period (or immediately for implementations
that do not have one), the server MUST destroy push subscriptions
that use the old key.
When destroying push subscriptions that include the data type
PushSubscription, the server MAY issue one final StateChange push
notification using the old URL and application server key to notify
the client of changes to the PushSubscription data type. This
prompts the client to make a PushSubscription/changes method call.
The response to this call will contain an updated sessionState, which
refers to a session object that contains the new VAPID key.
A race condition can occur when the server updates its VAPID key
after the client has refreshed the session object but before calling
the PushSubscription/set method. This situation causes the server to
send a PushVerification object to a push resource URL that is now
associated with an outdated VAPID key. Consequently, the push
service will reject the PushVerification with a 403 (Forbidden)
status code, as specified in Section 4.2 of [RFC8292].
To alleviate this problem, the client MUST check if the sessionState
in the response from the PushSubscription/set method points to a
session object with an applicationServerKey that matches their
expectations. If there is a mismatch, the client MAY retry creating
the PushSubscription. Additionally, the client MAY destroy the
PushSubscription from the earlier, failed attempt.
6. Security Considerations
During the key rotation process, synchronization issues between the
client and server may arise. Specifically, a client might restrict a
push subscription with the push service to an outdated key, while the
server sends the PushVerification object authenticated with the newly
rotated key. This mismatch leads to the push service rejecting the
PushVerification request with a 403 (Forbidden) status code, as
specified in Section 4.2 of [RFC8292].
Per the requirements of Section 7.2 of [RFC8620], the server MUST NOT
retry the rejected PushVerification request. Consequently, the
PushVerification object will not be delivered to the client.
To mitigate such issues, the client is responsible for detecting and
resolving any synchronization discrepancies, as outlined in Section 5
of this document.
The inclusion of the urn:ietf:params:jmap:webpush-vapid property in
the JMAP capabilities object is limited to providing information
about the server's support for VAPID. This property does not reveal
sensitive information, nor does it introduce new security or privacy
risks beyond those inherent to JMAP and Web Push. The security
considerations for JMAP [RFC8620] (especially Sections 8.6 and 8.7),
Web Push [RFC8030], and VAPID [RFC8292] apply to this document.
7. IANA Considerations
7.1. Registration of the JMAP Capability for VAPID
IANA has registered the following new capability in the "JMAP
Capabilities" registry:
Capability Name: urn:ietf:params:jmap:webpush-vapid
Intended Use: common
Change Controller: IETF
Security and Privacy Considerations: RFC 9749, Section 6
Reference: RFC 9749
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[FIPS186] NIST, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", NIST FIPS 186-5,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-5, February 2023,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-5>.
[SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Version 2.0, May 2009,
<http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.
[RFC8620] Jenkins, N. and C. Newman, "The JSON Meta Application
Protocol (JMAP)", RFC 8620, DOI 10.17487/RFC8620, July
2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8620>.
[RFC8030] Thomson, M., Damaggio, E., and B. Raymor, Ed., "Generic
Event Delivery Using HTTP Push", RFC 8030,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8030, December 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8030>.
[RFC8292] Thomson, M. and P. Beverloo, "Voluntary Application Server
Identification (VAPID) for Web Push", RFC 8292,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8292, November 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8292>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
8.2. Informative References
[PUSH-API] Beverloo, P., Ed., Thomson, M., Ed., and M. Caceres, Ed.,
"Push API", W3C Working Draft, September 2024,
<https://www.w3.org/TR/push-api/>.
Author's Address
Daniel Gultsch
Email: daniel@gultsch.de
AI ELI5
On this page
§1Why JMAP Needs VAPID
RFC 8620 (JMAP) lets clients subscribe to events with a protocol compatible with Web Push (RFC 8030). Some push services require the application server to authenticate every push message using VAPID (RFC 8292). To make that work, the client needs the application server's VAPID public key to pass to the push service when it retrieves a new endpoint.
The post office will only deliver notes from senders it can identify, so your app has to tell it who the real sender is.
§3Discovering and Using the Key
Servers supporting this RFC MUST add a property named urn:ietf:params:jmap:webpush-vapid to the capabilities object of the JMAP session object. Its value is an object that MUST contain applicationServerKey: the ECDSA public key in uncompressed form (SEC 1, Section 2.3.3), encoded with base64url. Current systems use the P-256 curve. The format was chosen to be compatible with the browser Push API, so the key can be used without transformation.
Every time the server sends a push message to a PushSubscription URL, including StateChange events and PushVerification notifications, it MUST authenticate the POST request using RFC 8292, with a JSON Web Token signed by the private key matching the advertised key. The key MUST be the one advertised when the PushSubscription was created.
The server posts its ID badge in a public place, and signs every note it sends so the post office can check the signature against the badge.
§5Key Rotation
When the server replaces its VAPID key, it MUST update the sessionState. The client MUST watch the session object for changes to the key and MUST recreate its push subscription when the key changes. The server MAY keep sending pushes with the old key for a transitional period, and at its end MUST destroy subscriptions that use the old key. It MAY send one final StateChange push first, which prompts the client to call PushSubscription/changes and learn the new key.
A race can occur if the key changes after the client refreshed the session but before it calls PushSubscription/set. The push service then rejects the PushVerification with 403 (Forbidden). The client MUST check that the sessionState in the response points to a session with the key it expects. On a mismatch it MAY retry, and MAY destroy the failed earlier subscription.
When the server gets a new ID badge, your app has to notice and sign up again with the new badge number.
§6Security and Registration
During rotation, a client might restrict a push subscription to an outdated key while the server signs a PushVerification with the new one. The push service rejects it with 403, and per RFC 8620 the server MUST NOT retry, so the PushVerification is never delivered. The client is responsible for detecting and resolving this.
Advertising the capability reveals only that the server supports VAPID, and adds no new security or privacy risks beyond those of JMAP and Web Push. IANA registered the capability urn:ietf:params:jmap:webpush-vapid in the "JMAP Capabilities" registry with intended use common.
If the badge changes at the wrong moment, one message may get turned away, and your app is the one that has to notice and fix it.