RFC 9549 PROPOSED STANDARD PKI · CERTIFICATES · INTERNATIONALIZATION

Internationalization Updates to RFC 5280

How X.509 certificates carry internationalized domain names and email addresses, with every name stored in its ASCII form.

On rfc-editor.org ↗
PUBLISHED
March 2024
AUTHORS
R. Housley
STREAM
IETF
BUILDS ON
RFC 8399 — RFC 5280 i18n, RFC 5280 — X.509 Certificates
ACE PREFIX
xn--
EXTRA CHARACTERS PER ACE LABEL
4 (the prefix)
WORST CASE PER INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER
up to 5 ASCII characters
IANA ACTIONS
None
DOI
10.17487/RFC9549

RFC text

Contents
Original text · RFC Editor View on rfc-editor.org ↗
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                        R. Housley
Request for Comments: 9549                                Vigil Security
Obsoletes: 8399                                               March 2024
Updates: 5280
Category: Standards Track
ISSN: 2070-1721


                Internationalization Updates to RFC 5280

Abstract

   The updates to RFC 5280 described in this document provide alignment
   with the 2008 specification for Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs)
   and includes support for internationalized email addresses in X.509
   certificates.  The updates ensure that name constraints for email
   addresses that contain only ASCII characters and internationalized
   email addresses are handled in the same manner.  This document
   obsoletes RFC 8399.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9549.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   Contributions published or made publicly available before November
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   than English.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction
     1.1.  Terminology
     1.2.  Changes since RFC 8399
   2.  Updates to RFC 5280
     2.1.  Update in the Introduction (Section 1)
     2.2.  Update in Name Constraints (Section 4.2.1.10)
     2.3.  Update in IDNs in GeneralName (Section 7.2)
     2.4.  Update in IDNs in Distinguished Names (Section 7.3)
     2.5.  Update in Internationalized Electronic Mail Addresses
           (Section 7.5)
   3.  Security Considerations
   4.  IANA Considerations
   5.  References
     5.1.  Normative References
     5.2.  Informative References
   Acknowledgements
   Author's Address

1.  Introduction

   This document updates the Introduction in Section 1, the Name
   Constraints certificate extension discussion in Section 4.2.1.10, and
   the Processing Rules for Internationalized Names in Section 7 of RFC
   5280 [RFC5280] to provide alignment with the 2008 specification for
   Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs) and includes support for
   internationalized email addresses in X.509 certificates.

   An IDN in Unicode (native character) form contains at least one
   U-label [RFC5890].  IDNs are carried in certificates in ACE-encoded
   form.  That is, all U-labels within an IDN are converted to A-labels.
   Conversion of a U-label to an A-label is described in [RFC5891].

   The GeneralName structure supports many different name forms,
   including otherName for extensibility.  RFC 8398 [RFC8398] specifies
   the SmtpUTF8Mailbox for internationalized email addresses.

   Note that Internationalized Domain Names in Applications
   specifications published in 2003 (IDNA2003) [RFC3490] and 2008
   (IDNA2008) [RFC5890] both refer to the Punycode algorithm for
   conversion [RFC3492].

   Note that characters in the Unicode Category "Symbol, Other" (So) are
   specifically not included in IDNA2003 [RFC3490] or IDNA2008
   [RFC5890]; the derived property values for characters in this
   category are calculated as DISALLOWED.  Thus, some characters that
   are allowed under the Unicode IDNA Compatibility Processing [UTS46]
   are not allowed under this specification.  For instance, ♚.example,
   which contains the Unicode character U+1F0A1 (BLACK CHESS KING),
   results in a failure under this specification, but it becomes
   xn--45h.example under [UTS46].

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

1.2.  Changes since RFC 8399

   In some cases, [RFC8399] required conversion of A-labels to U-labels
   in order to process name constraints for internationalized email
   addresses.  This led to implementation complexity and at least two
   security vulnerabilities.  One summary of the vulnerabilities can be
   found in [DDHQ].  Now, all IDNs are carried and processed as
   A-labels.

   The Introduction provides a warning to implementers about the
   handling of characters in the Unicode Category "Symbol, Other" (So),
   which includes emoji characters.

2.  Updates to RFC 5280

   This section provides updates to several paragraphs of [RFC5280].
   For clarity, if the entire section is not replaced, then the original
   text and the replacement text are shown.

2.1.  Update in the Introduction (Section 1)

   This update provides references for IDNA2008.

   OLD

   |  *  Enhanced support for internationalized names is specified in
   |     Section 7, with rules for encoding and comparing
   |     Internationalized Domain Names, Internationalized Resource
   |     Identifiers (IRIs), and distinguished names.  These rules are
   |     aligned with comparison rules established in current RFCs,
   |     including [RFC3490], [RFC3987], and [RFC4518].

   NEW

   |  *  Enhanced support for internationalized names is specified in
   |     Section 7, with rules for encoding and comparing
   |     Internationalized Domain Names, Internationalized Resource
   |     Identifiers (IRIs), and distinguished names.  These rules are
   |     aligned with comparison rules established in current RFCs,
   |     including [RFC3987], [RFC4518], [RFC5890], and [RFC5891].

2.2.  Update in Name Constraints (Section 4.2.1.10)

   This update removes the ability to include constraints for a
   particular mailbox.  This capability was not used, and removing it
   allows name constraints to apply to email addresses in rfc822Name and
   SmtpUTF8Mailbox [RFC8398] within otherName.

   OLD

   |  A name constraint for Internet mail addresses MAY specify a
   |  particular mailbox, all addresses at a particular host, or all
   |  mailboxes in a domain.  To indicate a particular mailbox, the
   |  constraint is the complete mail address.  For example,
   |  "root@example.com" indicates the root mailbox on the host
   |  "example.com".  To indicate all Internet mail addresses on a
   |  particular host, the constraint is specified as the host name.
   |  For example, the constraint "example.com" is satisfied by any mail
   |  address at the host "example.com".  To specify any address within
   |  a domain, the constraint is specified with a leading period (as
   |  with URIs).  For example, ".example.com" indicates all the
   |  Internet mail addresses in the domain "example.com", but not
   |  Internet mail addresses on the host "example.com".

   NEW

   |  A name constraint for Internet mail addresses MAY specify all
   |  addresses at a particular host or all mailboxes in a domain.  To
   |  indicate all Internet mail addresses on a particular host, the
   |  constraint is specified as the host name.  For example, the
   |  constraint "example.com" is satisfied by any mail address at the
   |  host "example.com".  To specify any address within a domain, the
   |  constraint is specified with a leading period (as with URIs).  For
   |  example, ".example.com" indicates all the Internet mail addresses
   |  in the domain "example.com" but not Internet mail addresses on the
   |  host "example.com".

2.3.  Update in IDNs in GeneralName (Section 7.2)

   This update aligns with IDNA2008.  Since all of Section 7.2 of
   [RFC5280] is replaced, the OLD text is not provided.

   NEW

   |  Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs) may be included in
   |  certificates and CRLs in the subjectAltName and issuerAltName
   |  extensions, name constraints extension, authority information
   |  access extension, subject information access extension, CRL
   |  distribution points extension, and issuing distribution point
   |  extension.  Each of these extensions uses the GeneralName type;
   |  one choice in GeneralName is the dNSName field, which is defined
   |  as type IA5String.
   |
   |  IA5String is limited to the set of ASCII characters.  To
   |  accommodate IDNs, U-labels are converted to A-labels.  The A-label
   |  is the encoding of the U-label according to the Punycode algorithm
   |  [RFC3492] with the ACE prefix "xn--" added at the beginning of the
   |  string.
   |
   |  When comparing DNS names for equality, conforming implementations
   |  MUST perform a case-insensitive exact match on the entire DNS
   |  name.  When evaluating name constraints, conforming
   |  implementations MUST perform a case-insensitive exact match on a
   |  label-by-label basis.  As noted in Section 4.2.1.10, any DNS name
   |  that may be constructed by adding labels to the left-hand side of
   |  the domain name given as the constraint is considered to fall
   |  within the indicated subtree.
   |
   |  Implementations that have a user interface SHOULD convert IDNs to
   |  Unicode for display.  Specifically, conforming implementations
   |  convert A-labels to U-labels for display purposes.
   |
   |  Implementation consideration: There are increased memory
   |  requirements for IDNs.  An IDN ACE label will begin with the four
   |  additional characters "xn--", and an IDN can require as many as
   |  five ASCII characters to specify a single international character.

2.4.  Update in IDNs in Distinguished Names (Section 7.3)

   This update aligns with IDNA2008.

   OLD

   |  Domain Names may also be represented as distinguished names using
   |  domain components in the subject field, the issuer field, the
   |  subjectAltName extension, or the issuerAltName extension.  As with
   |  the dNSName in the GeneralName type, the value of this attribute
   |  is defined as an IA5String.  Each domainComponent attribute
   |  represents a single label.  To represent a label from an IDN in
   |  the distinguished name, the implementation MUST perform the
   |  "ToASCII" label conversion specified in Section 4.1 of RFC 3490.
   |  The label SHALL be considered a "stored string".  That is, the
   |  AllowUnassigned flag SHALL NOT be set.

   NEW

   |  Domain names may also be represented as distinguished names using
   |  domain components in the subject field, the issuer field, the
   |  subjectAltName extension, or the issuerAltName extension.  As with
   |  the dNSName in the GeneralName type, the value of this attribute
   |  is defined as an IA5String.  Each domainComponent attribute
   |  represents a single label.  To represent a label from an IDN in
   |  the distinguished name, the implementation MUST convert all
   |  U-labels to A-labels.

2.5.  Update in Internationalized Electronic Mail Addresses
      (Section 7.5)

   This update aligns with IDNA2008 and [RFC8398].  Since all of
   Section 7.5 of [RFC5280] is replaced, the OLD text is not provided.

   NEW

   |  Electronic Mail addresses may be included in certificates and CRLs
   |  in the subjectAltName and issuerAltName extensions, name
   |  constraints extension, authority information access extension,
   |  subject information access extension, issuing distribution point
   |  extension, or CRL distribution points extension.  Each of these
   |  extensions uses the GeneralName construct.  If the email address
   |  includes an IDN but the local-part of the email address can be
   |  represented in ASCII, then the email address is placed in the
   |  rfc822Name choice of GeneralName, which is defined as type
   |  IA5String.  If the local-part of the internationalized email
   |  address cannot be represented in ASCII, then the internationalized
   |  email address is placed in the otherName choice of GeneralName
   |  using the conventions in RFC 8398 [RFC8398].
   |
   |  When the host-part contains an IDN, conforming implementations
   |  MUST convert all U-labels to A-labels.
   |
   |  7.5.1.  Local-Part Contains Only ASCII Characters
   |
   |  Two email addresses are considered to match if:
   |
   |  1)  The local-part of each name is an exact match, AND
   |
   |  2)  The host-part of each name matches using a case-insensitive
   |      ASCII comparison.
   |
   |  Implementations that have a user interface SHOULD convert the
   |  host-part of internationalized email addresses specified in these
   |  extensions to Unicode before display.  Specifically, conforming
   |  implementations convert A-labels to U-labels for display purposes.
   |
   |  7.5.2.  Local-Part Contains Non-ASCII Characters
   |
   |  When the local-part contains non-ASCII characters, conforming
   |  implementations MUST place the internationalized email address in
   |  the SmtpUTF8Mailbox within the otherName choice of GeneralName as
   |  specified in Section 3 of RFC 8398 [RFC8398].  Note that the UTF8
   |  encoding of the internationalized email address MUST NOT contain a
   |  Byte-Order-Mark (BOM) [RFC3629] to aid comparison.  The email
   |  address local-part within the SmtpUTF8Mailbox MUST conform to the
   |  requirements of [RFC6530] and [RFC6531].
   |
   |  Two email addresses are considered to match if:
   |
   |  1)  The local-part of each name is an exact match, AND
   |
   |  2)  The host-part of each name matches using a case-insensitive
   |      ASCII comparison.
   |
   |  Implementations that have a user interface SHOULD convert the
   |  host-part of internationalized email addresses specified in these
   |  extensions to Unicode before display.  Specifically, conforming
   |  implementations convert A-labels to U-labels for display purposes.

3.  Security Considerations

   The Security Considerations related to internationalized names in
   Section 4 of [RFC5890] are relevant to this specification.

   Conforming Certification Authorities (CAs) SHOULD ensure that IDNs
   are valid according to IDNA2008, which is defined in [RFC5890],
   [RFC5891], [RFC5892], [RFC5893], [RFC5894], and the updates to these
   documents.  Failure to use valid A-labels may yield a domain name
   that cannot be correctly represented in the Domain Name System (DNS).
   In addition, the CA/Browser Forum offers some guidance regarding
   internal server names in certificates [CABF].

   An earlier version of this specification [RFC8399] required
   conversion of A-labels to U-labels in order to process name
   constraints for internationalized email addresses in SmtpUTF8Mailbox
   other names.  This led to implementation complexity and at least two
   security vulnerabilities.  Now, all IDNs are carried and processed as
   A-labels.

4.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

5.  References

5.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3492]  Costello, A., "Punycode: A Bootstring encoding of Unicode
              for Internationalized Domain Names in Applications
              (IDNA)", RFC 3492, DOI 10.17487/RFC3492, March 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3492>.

   [RFC3629]  Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
              10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
              2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.

   [RFC3987]  Duerst, M. and M. Suignard, "Internationalized Resource
              Identifiers (IRIs)", RFC 3987, DOI 10.17487/RFC3987,
              January 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3987>.

   [RFC4518]  Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
              (LDAP): Internationalized String Preparation", RFC 4518,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4518, June 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4518>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC5890]  Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for
              Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework",
              RFC 5890, DOI 10.17487/RFC5890, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5890>.

   [RFC5891]  Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names in
              Applications (IDNA): Protocol", RFC 5891,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5891, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5891>.

   [RFC5892]  Faltstrom, P., Ed., "The Unicode Code Points and
              Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA)",
              RFC 5892, DOI 10.17487/RFC5892, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5892>.

   [RFC5893]  Alvestrand, H., Ed. and C. Karp, "Right-to-Left Scripts
              for Internationalized Domain Names for Applications
              (IDNA)", RFC 5893, DOI 10.17487/RFC5893, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5893>.

   [RFC6530]  Klensin, J. and Y. Ko, "Overview and Framework for
              Internationalized Email", RFC 6530, DOI 10.17487/RFC6530,
              February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6530>.

   [RFC6531]  Yao, J. and W. Mao, "SMTP Extension for Internationalized
              Email", RFC 6531, DOI 10.17487/RFC6531, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6531>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8398]  Melnikov, A., Ed. and W. Chuang, Ed., "Internationalized
              Email Addresses in X.509 Certificates", RFC 8398,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8398, May 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8398>.

5.2.  Informative References

   [CABF]     CA/Browser Forum, "Internal Server Names and IP Address
              Requirements for SSL: Guidance on the Deprecation of
              Internal Server Names and Reserved IP Addresses provided
              by the CA/Browser Forum", Version 1.0, June 2012,
              <https://cabforum.org/internal-names/>.

   [DDHQ]     Datadog Security Labs, "The OpenSSL punycode vulnerability
              (CVE-2022-3602): Overview, detection, exploitation, and
              remediation", 1 November 2022,
              <https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/openssl-
              november-1-vulnerabilities/>.

   [RFC3490]  Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P., and A. Costello,
              "Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (IDNA)",
              RFC 3490, DOI 10.17487/RFC3490, March 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3490>.

   [RFC5894]  Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for
              Applications (IDNA): Background, Explanation, and
              Rationale", RFC 5894, DOI 10.17487/RFC5894, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5894>.

   [RFC8399]  Housley, R., "Internationalization Updates to RFC 5280",
              RFC 8399, DOI 10.17487/RFC8399, May 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8399>.

   [UTS46]    Davis, M. and M. Suignard, "Unicode Technical Standard
              #46: Unicode IDNA Compatibility Processing", Revision 31,
              The Unicode Consortium, Mountain View, September 2023,
              <https://www.unicode.org/reports/tr46>.

Acknowledgements

   Thanks to David Benjamin and Wei Chuang for identifying the issue and
   a solution.

   Thanks to Takahiro Nemoto, John Klensin, Mike Ounsworth, and Orie
   Steele for their careful review and thoughtful comments.

Author's Address

   Russ Housley
   Vigil Security, LLC
   Herndon, VA
   United States of America
   Email: housley@vigilsec.com

AI ELI5

On this page
PROBLEMRFC 5280 described internationalized names in terms of the 2003 IDN specification, and an earlier fix (RFC 8399) made name constraints for internationalized email hard to implement and led to at least two security vulnerabilities.
MECHANISMRFC 9549 replaces several paragraphs of RFC 5280 so that it matches the 2008 IDN specification (IDNA2008), and requires every internationalized domain name to be carried and processed as an A-label, the ASCII form that starts with xn--.
WHY IT MATTERSName constraints now treat ASCII-only and internationalized email addresses the same way, mailbox-level constraints are removed, and RFC 8399 is obsoleted.

§1What This Update Covers

RFC 9549 updates three places in RFC 5280, the X.509 certificate and CRL profile: the Introduction (Section 1), the Name Constraints extension (Section 4.2.1.10), and the processing rules for internationalized names (Section 7). The goal is to align with the 2008 specification for Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs) and to support internationalized email addresses in certificates.

An IDN in Unicode form contains at least one U-label. In certificates, IDNs are carried in ACE-encoded form, meaning every U-label is converted to an A-label. Both IDNA2003 and IDNA2008 use the Punycode algorithm for this conversion. For email, RFC 8398 defines the SmtpUTF8Mailbox form, which lives inside the otherName choice of GeneralName.

Characters in the Unicode category "Symbol, Other" (So), which includes emoji, are not allowed by IDNA2003 or IDNA2008. Some characters allowed by Unicode IDNA Compatibility Processing (UTS #46) are therefore rejected here. For example, a name built on U+1F0A1 (BLACK CHESS KING) fails under this specification but becomes xn--45h.example under UTS #46.

Some web names have letters from other languages, or even little pictures. Certificates store them in a plain-letter code, and this memo explains the rules. Pictures like emoji are not allowed in these names.

§1.2Why RFC 8399 Was Replaced

The earlier version of this update, RFC 8399, sometimes required converting A-labels back to U-labels in order to process name constraints for internationalized email addresses. According to RFC 9549, this led to implementation complexity and at least two security vulnerabilities.

The fix is simple to state: now all IDNs are carried and processed as A-labels. RFC 9549 also adds a warning to the Introduction about characters in the "Symbol, Other" category, and it obsoletes RFC 8399.

The old rule asked computers to flip names back and forth between two spellings, and that made mistakes easy. The new rule keeps everything in one spelling the whole time.

§2.3Domain Names in Certificates

Section 7.2 of RFC 5280 is replaced in full. IDNs may appear in the subjectAltName and issuerAltName extensions, name constraints, authority and subject information access, CRL distribution points, and issuing distribution point extensions. All of them use GeneralName, whose dNSName field is an IA5String, which is limited to ASCII.

To fit, U-labels are converted to A-labels: the Punycode encoding of the U-label with the ACE prefix xn-- added at the start. Comparisons are strict. Conforming implementations MUST do a case-insensitive exact match on the entire DNS name when comparing names for equality, and a case-insensitive exact match label by label when evaluating name constraints. Any DNS name built by adding labels on the left of the constraint falls inside the constrained subtree.

Implementations that have a user interface SHOULD convert A-labels back to U-labels for display. IDNs also need more memory: an ACE label starts with four extra characters (xn--), and a single international character can take as many as five ASCII characters.

Section 7.3 gets a matching change for domain names written as distinguished names with domainComponent attributes. The old text required the "ToASCII" conversion from RFC 3490; the new text says implementations MUST convert all U-labels to A-labels.

A certificate can only write names in plain letters, so a name in another alphabet is turned into a code starting with "xn--". Programs compare these codes letter for letter, and show people the nice version on screen.

§2.2Name Constraints for Email

A name constraint limits which names a certification authority may issue certificates for. The update to Section 4.2.1.10 removes the ability to constrain a particular mailbox, such as the complete address of one account. The RFC says this capability was not used, and removing it lets name constraints apply to email addresses in both rfc822Name and SmtpUTF8Mailbox within otherName.

What remains is two forms. A constraint of the host name, for example example.com, is satisfied by any mail address at that host. A constraint with a leading period, for example .example.com, matches all mail addresses in the domain but not addresses on the host example.com itself.

Imagine a rule that says a school may only hand out ID cards for its own classrooms. You can say "everyone in this room" or "everyone in this hallway", but you can no longer say "just this one kid".

§2.5Internationalized Email Addresses

Section 7.5 of RFC 5280 is replaced in full. Where an email address goes depends on its local-part (the part before the @). If the address includes an IDN but the local-part can be written in ASCII, the address goes in the rfc822Name choice of GeneralName, an IA5String. If the local-part cannot be written in ASCII, the address goes in SmtpUTF8Mailbox within otherName, following Section 3 of RFC 8398.

When the host-part contains an IDN, implementations MUST convert all U-labels to A-labels. Two addresses match when the local-parts match exactly and the host-parts match with a case-insensitive ASCII comparison. For the non-ASCII case, the UTF-8 encoding MUST NOT contain a Byte-Order-Mark, to aid comparison, and the local-part MUST conform to RFC 6530 and RFC 6531. As with domain names, a user interface SHOULD convert the host-part to Unicode before display.

Email addresses go in one of two boxes. If the part before the @ is plain letters, it goes in the ordinary box. If it has special letters, it goes in a special box built for that.

WHERE AN EMAIL ADDRESS GOES IN GENERALNAME
Local-partGeneralName choiceHost-part rule
ASCII onlyrfc822Name (IA5String)U-labels converted to A-labels
Contains non-ASCII THIS RFCSmtpUTF8Mailbox in otherNameU-labels converted to A-labels

§3Security Considerations

The security considerations for internationalized names in Section 4 of RFC 5890 apply. Conforming certification authorities SHOULD ensure that IDNs are valid according to IDNA2008. Failure to use valid A-labels may produce a domain name that cannot be correctly represented in the DNS.

The RFC repeats the lesson from RFC 8399: converting A-labels to U-labels to process name constraints for email in SmtpUTF8Mailbox led to implementation complexity and at least two security vulnerabilities, so now all IDNs are carried and processed as A-labels. It also points to the CA/Browser Forum guidance on internal server names in certificates. There are no IANA actions.

Switching spellings back and forth caused real bugs that attackers could use. Keeping one spelling all the way through is safer.

§7References