MIPv6 bootstrapping: Problem Statement for bootstrapping Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6)

Network Working Group                                      A. Patel, Ed.
Request for Comments: 4640                                         Cisco
Category: Informational                                 G. Giaretta, Ed.
                                                          Telecom Italia
                                                          September 2006


        Problem Statement for Bootstrapping Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6)


Status of This Memo

   This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does
   not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this
   memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

Abstract

   A mobile node needs at least the following information: a home
   address, a home agent address, and a security association with home
   agent to register with the home agent.  The process of obtaining this
   information is called bootstrapping.  This document discusses issues
   involved with how the mobile node can be bootstrapped for Mobile IPv6
   (MIPv6) and various potential deployment scenarios for mobile node
   bootstrapping.

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction ....................................................2
      1.1. Overview of the Problem ....................................3
      1.2. Bootstrapping ..............................................3
      1.3. Terminology ................................................4
   2. Assumptions .....................................................5
   3. Design Goals ....................................................6
   4. Non-goals .......................................................7
   5. Motivation for bootstrapping ....................................7
      5.1. Addressing .................................................7
           5.1.1. Dynamic Home Address Assignment .....................7
           5.1.2. Dynamic Home Agent Assignment .......................9
           5.1.3. "Opportunistic" or "Local" Discovery ................9
           5.1.4. Management Requirements .............................9
      5.2. Security Infrastructure ...................................10
           5.2.1. Integration with AAA Infrastructure ................10
      5.3. Topology Change ...........................................10

           5.3.1. Dormant Mode Mobile Nodes ..........................10
   6. Network Access and Mobility Services ...........................11
   7. Deployment Scenarios ...........................................13
      7.1. Mobility Service Subscription Scenario ....................13
      7.2. Integrated ASP Network Scenario ...........................14
      7.3. Third-Party MSP Scenario ..................................14
      7.4. Infrastructure-less Scenario ..............................15
   8. Parameters for Authentication ..................................15
   9. Security Considerations ........................................17
      9.1. Security Requirements of Mobile IPv6 ......................17
      9.2. Threats to the Bootstrapping Process ......................18
   10. Contributors ..................................................19
   11. Acknowledgements ..............................................20
   12. Informative References ........................................20

1.  Introduction

   Mobile IPv6 [RFC3775] specifies mobility support based on the
   assumption that a mobile node (MN) has a trust relationship with an
   entity called the home agent.  Once the home agent address has been
   learned (for example, via manual configuration, anycast discovery
   mechanisms, or DNS lookup), Mobile IPv6 signaling messages between
   the mobile node and the home agent are secured with IPsec or with the
   authentication protocol, as defined in [RFC4285].  The requirements
   for this security architecture are created with [RFC3775], and the
   details of this procedure are described in [RFC3776].

   In [RFC3775], there is an implicit requirement that the MN be
   provisioned with enough information that will permit it to register
   successfully with its home agent.  However, having this information
   statically provisioned creates practical deployment issues.

   This document serves to define the problem of bootstrapping.
   Bootstrapping is defined as the process of obtaining enough
   information at the mobile node that it can successfully register with
   an appropriate home agent.

   The requirements for bootstrapping could consider various
   scenarios/network deployment issues.  It is the basic assumption of
   this document that certain minimal parameters (seed information) are
   available to the mobile node to aid in bootstrapping.  The exact seed
   information available differs depending on the deployment scenario.
   This document describes various deployment scenarios and provides a
   set of minimal parameters that are available in each deployment
   scenario.

   This document stops short of suggesting the preferred solutions for
   how the mobile node should obtain information.  Such details will be
   available from separate documents.

1.1.  Overview of the Problem

   Mobile IPv6 [RFC3775] expects the mobile node to have a static home
   address, a home agent address (which can be derived from an anycast
   address), and a security association with a home agent (or multiple
   home agents).

   This static provisioning of information has various problems, as
   discussed in Section 5.

   The aim of this document is:

   o  To define bootstrapping;

   o  To identify sample deployment scenarios where Mobile Internet
      Protocol version 6 (MIPv6) will be deployed, taking into account
      the relationship between the subscriber and the service provider;
      and

   o  To identify the minimal set of information required on the Mobile
      Node and in the network in order for the mobile node to obtain
      address and security credentials, to register with the home agent.

1.2.  Bootstrapping

   Bootstrapping is defined as obtaining enough information at the
   mobile node that the mobile node can successfully register with an
   appropriate home agent.  Specifically, this means obtaining the home
   agent address and home address, and for the mobile node and home
   agent to authenticate and mutually construct security credentials for
   Mobile IPv6.

   Typically, bootstrapping happens when a mobile node does not have all
   the information it needs to set up the Mobile IPv6 service.  This
   includes, but is not limited to, situations in which the mobile node
   does not having any information when it boots up for the first time
   (out of the box), or does not retain any information during reboots.

   Also, in certain scenarios, after the MN bootstraps for the first
   time (out of the box), the need for subsequent bootstrapping is
   implementation dependent.  For instance, the MN may bootstrap every
   time it boots, bootstrap every time on prefix change, or bootstrap
   periodically to anchor to an optimal HA (based on distance, load,
   etc.).

1.3.  Terminology

   General mobility terminology can be found in [RFC3753].  The
   following additional terms are used here:

   Trust relationship

      In the context of this document, trust relationship means that the
      two parties in question, typically the user of the mobile host and
      the mobility or access service authorizer, have some sort of prior
      contact in which the mobile node was provisioned with credentials.
      These credentials allow the mobile node to authenticate itself to
      the mobility or access service provider and to prove its
      authorization to obtain service.

   Infrastructureless relationship

      In the context of this document, an infrastructureless
      relationship is one in which the user of the mobile node and the
      mobility or access service provider have no previous contact and
      the mobile node is not required to supply credentials to
      authenticate and prove authorization for service.  Mobility and/or
      network access service is provided without any authentication or
      authorization.  Infrastructureless in this context does not mean
      that there is no network infrastructure, such as would be the case
      for an ad hoc network.

   Credentials

      Data used by a mobile node to authenticate itself to a mobility or
      access network service authorizer and to prove authorization to
      receive service.  User name/passwords, one time password cards,
      public/private key pairs with certificates, and biometric
      information are some examples.

   ASA

      Access Service Authorizer.  A network operator that authenticates
      a mobile node and establishes the mobile node's authorization to
      receive Internet service.

   ASP

      Access Service Provider.  A network operator that provides direct
      IP packet forwarding to and from the end host.

   Serving Network Access Provider

      A network operator that is the mobile node's ASP but not its ASA.
      The serving network access provider may or may not additionally
      provide mobility service.

   Home Network Access Provider

      A network operator that is both the mobile node's ASP and ASA.
      The home network access provider may or may not additionally
      provide mobility service (note that this is a slightly different
      definition from that in RFC 3775).

   IASP

      Integrated Access Service Provider.  A service provider that
      provides both authorization for network access and mobility
      service.

   MSA

      Mobility Service Authorizer.  A service provider that authorizes
      Mobile IPv6 service.

   MSP

      Mobility Service Provider.  A service provider that provides
      Mobile IPv6 service.  In order to obtain such service, the mobile
      node must be authenticated and prove authorization to obtain the
      service.
   Home Mobility Service Provider

      A MSP that both provides mobility service and authorizes it.

   Serving Mobility Service Provider

      A MSP that provides mobility service but depends on another
      service provider to authorize it.

2.  Assumptions

   o  A basic assumption in Mobile IPv6 [RFC3775] is that there is a
      trust relationship between the mobile node and its home agent(s).
      This trust relationship can be direct, or indirect through, for
      instance, an ASP that has a contract with the MSP.  This trust
      relationship can be used to bootstrap the MN.

      One typical way of verifying the trust relationship is using
      authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA)
      infrastructure.  In this document, two distinct uses of AAA are
      considered:

      AAA for Network Access

         This functionality provides authentication and authorization to
         access the network (obtain address and send/receive packets).

      AAA for Mobility Service

         This functionality provides authentication and authorization
         for mobility services.

      These functionalities may be implemented in a single entity or in
      different entities, depending on the service models described in
      Section 6 or deployment scenarios as described in Section 7.

   o  Some identifier, such as an Network Access Identifier (NAI), as
      defined in [RFC4283] or [RFC2794], is provisioned on the MN that
      permits the MN to identify itself to the ASP and MSP.

3.  Design Goals

   A solution to the bootstrapping problem has the following design
   goals:

   o  The following information must be available at the end of
      bootstrapping, to enable the MN to register with the HA.

      *  MN's home agent address

      *  MN's home address

      *  IPsec Security Association (SA) between MN and HA, Intenet Key
         Exchange Protocol (IKE) pre-shared secret between MN and HA

   o  The bootstrapping procedure can be triggered at any time, either
      by the MN or by the network.  Bootstrapping can occur, for
      instance, due to administrative action, information going stale,
      or HA indicating the MN.  Bootstrapping may be initiated even when
      the MN is registered with the HA and has all the required
      credentials.  This may typically happen to refresh/renew the
      credentials.

   o  Subsequent protocol interaction (for example, updating the IPsec
      SA) can be executed between the MN and the HA itself without
      involving the infrastructure that was used during bootstrapping.

   o  Solutions to the bootstrapping problem should enable storage of
      user-specific information on entities other than the home agent.

   o  Solutions to the bootstrapping problem should not exclude storage
      of user-specific information on entities other than the home
      agent.

   o  Configuration information which is exchanged between the mobile
      node and the home agent must be secured using integrity and replay
      protection.  Confidentiality protection should be provided if
      necessary.

   o  The solution should be applicable to all feasible deployment
      scenarios that can be envisaged, along with the relevant
      authentication/authorization models.

4.  Non-goals

   This following issues are clearly outside the scope of bootstrapping:

   o  Home prefix renumbering is not explicitly supported as part of
      bootstrapping.  If the MN executes the bootstrap procedures every
      time it powers on (as opposed to caching state information from
      previous bootstrap process), then home network renumbering is
      taken care of automatically.

   o  Bootstrapping in the absence of a trust relationship between MN
      and any provider is not considered.

5.  Motivation for bootstrapping

5.1.  Addressing

   The default bootstrapping described in the Mobile IPv6 base
   specification [RFC3775] has a tight binding to the home addresses and
   home agent addresses.

   In this section, we discuss the problems caused by the currently
   tight binding to home addresses and home agent addresses.

5.1.1.  Dynamic Home Address Assignment

   Currently, the home agent uses the mobile node's home address for
   authorization.  When manual keying is used, this happens through the
   security policy database, which specifies that a certain security
   association may only be used for a specific home address.  When
   dynamic keying is used, the home agent ensures that the IKE Phase 1
   identity is authorized to request security associations for the given
   home address.  Mobile IPv6 uses IKEv1, which is unable to update the
   security policy database according to a dynamically assigned home
   address.  As a result, static home address assignment is really the
   only home address configuration technique compatible with the base
   specification.

   However, support for dynamic home address assignment would be
   desirable for the following reasons:

   Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)-based address assignment.
   Some providers may want to use DHCPv6 or other dynamic address
   assignment (e.g., IKEv2) from the home network to configure home
   addresses.

   Recovery from a duplicate address collision.  It may be necessary to
   recover from a collision of addresses on the home network by one of
   the mobile nodes changing its home address.

   Addressing privacy.  It may be desirable to establish randomly
   generated addresses as in [RFC3041] and use them for a short period
   of time.  Unfortunately, current protocols make it possible to use
   such addresses only from the visited network.  As a result, these
   addresses cannot be used for communications lasting longer than the
   attachment to a particular visited network.

   Ease of deployment.  In order to simplify the deployment of Mobile
   IPv6, it is desirable to free users and administrators from the task
   of allocating home addresses and specifying them in the security
   policy database.  This is consistent with the general IPv6 design
   goal of using autoconfiguration wherever possible.

   Prefix changes in the home network.  The Mobile IPv6 specification
   contains support for a mobile node to autoconfigure a home address as
   based on its discovery of prefix information on the home subnet
   [RFC3775].  Autoconfiguration in case of network renumbering is done
   by replacing the existing network prefix with the new network prefix.

   Subsequently, the MN needs to update the mobility binding in the HA
   to register the newly configured Home Address.  However, the MN may
   not be able to register the newly configured address with the HA if a
   security association related to that reconfigured Home Address does
   not exist in the MN and the HA.  This situation is not handled in the
   current MIPv6 specification [RFC3775].

5.1.2.  Dynamic Home Agent Assignment

   Currently, the address of the home agent is specified in the security
   policy database.  Support for multiple home agents requires the
   configuration of multiple security policy database entries.

   However, support for dynamic home agent assignment would be desirable
   for the following reasons:

   Home agent discovery.  The Mobile IPv6 specification contains support
   for a mobile node to autoconfigure a home agent address as based on a
   discovery protocol [RFC3775].

   Independent network management.  An MSP may want to assign home
   agents dynamically in different subnets; for instance, not require
   that a roaming mobile node have a fixed home subnet.

   Local home agents.  The mobile node's MSP may want to allow the
   serving MSP to assign a local home agent for the mobile node.  This
   is useful from the point of view of communications efficiency and has
   also been mentioned as one approach to support location privacy.

   Ease of deployment.  In order to simplify the deployment of Mobile
   IPv6, it is desirable to free users and administrators from the task
   of allocating home agent addresses in a static manner.  Moreover, an
   MSP may want to have a dynamic home agent assignment mechanism to
   load balance users among home agents located on different links.

5.1.3.  "Opportunistic" or "Local" Discovery

   The home agent discovery protocol does not support an "opportunistic"
   or local discovery mechanisms in an ASP's local access network.  It
   is expected that the mobile node must know the prefix of the home
   subnet in order to be able to discover a home agent.  It must either
   obtain that information through prefix update or have it statically
   configured.  A more typical pattern for inter-domain service
   discovery in the Internet is that the client (mobile node in this
   case) knows the domain name of the service and uses DNS to find the
   server in the visited domain.  For local service discovery, DHCP is
   typically used.

5.1.4.  Management Requirements

   As described earlier, new addresses invalidate configured security
   policy databases and authorization tables.  Regardless of the
   specific protocols used, there is a need for either an automatic
   system for updating the security policy entries or manual
   configuration.  These requirements apply to both home agents and
   mobile nodes, but it cannot be expected that mobile node users are
   capable of performing the required tasks.

5.2.  Security Infrastructure

5.2.1.  Integration with AAA Infrastructure

   The current IKEv1-based dynamic key exchange protocol, described in
   [RFC3776], has no integration with backend authentication,
   authorization, and accounting techniques unless the authentication
   credentials and trust relationships use certificates or pre-shared
   secrets.

   Certificates are not easily supported by traditional AAA
   infrastructures.  Where a traditional AAA infrastructure is used, the
   home agent is not able to leverage authentication and authorization
   information established between the mobile node, the foreign AAA
   server, and the home AAA server.  This would be desirable when the
   mobile node gains access to the foreign network, in order to
   authenticate the mobile node's identity and determine whether the
   mobile node is authorized for mobility service.

   The lack of connection to the AAA infrastructure also means that the
   home agent does not know where to send accounting records at
   appropriate times during the mobile node's session, as determined by
   the business relationship between the MSP and the mobile node's
   owner.

   Presumably, some backend AAA protocol between the home agent and home
   AAA could be utilized, but IKEv1 does not contain support for
   exchanging full AAA credentials with the mobile node.  It is
   worthwhile to note that IKEv2 provides this feature.

5.3.  Topology Change

5.3.1.  Dormant Mode Mobile Nodes

   The description of the protocol to push prefix information to mobile
   nodes in Section 10.6 of [RFC3775] has an implicit assumption that
   the mobile node is active and taking IP traffic.  In fact, many, if
   not most, mobile devices will be in a low power "dormant mode" to
   save battery power, or will even be switched off, so they will miss
   any propagation of prefix information.  As a practical matter, if
   this protocol is used, an MSP will need to keep the old prefix around
   and handle any queries to the old home agent anycast address on the
   old subnet, whereby the mobile node asks for a new home agent as
   described in Section 11.4, until all mobile nodes are accounted for.
   Even then, since some mobile nodes are likely to be turned off for
   long periods, some owners would need to be contacted by other means,
   reducing the utility of the protocol.

   Bootstrapping does not explicitly try to solve this problem of home
   network renumbering when MN is in dormant mode.  If the MN can
   configure itself after it 'comes back on' by reinitiating the
   bootstrapping process, then network renumbering problem is fixed as a
   side effect.

6.  Network Access and Mobility Services

   This section defines some terms as they pertain to authentication and
   practical network deployment/roaming scenarios.  This description
   lays the groundwork for Section 7.  The focus is on the 'service'
   model since, ultimately, it is the provider providing the service
   that wants to authenticate the mobile (and vice versa for mutual
   authentication between provider and the user of the service).

   Network access service enables a host to send and receive IP packets
   on the Internet or an intranet.  IP address configuration and IP
   packet forwarding capabilities are required to deliver this service.
   A network operator providing this service is called an access service
   provider (ASP).  An ASP can, for example, be a commercial ASP, the IT
   department of an enterprise network, or the maintainer of a home
   (residential) network.

   If the mobile node is not directly usable for communication at the
   current location of the MN in which network access service is
   provided by its home ASP, the mobile node is roaming.  In this case,
   the home ASP acts as the access service authorizer, but the actual
   network access is provided by the serving network access provider.
   During the authentication and authorization prior to the mobile nodes
   having Internet access, the serving network access provider may
   simply act as a routing agent for authentication and authorization
   back to the access service authorizer, or it may require an
   additional authentication and authorization step itself.  An example
   of a roaming situation is when a business person is using a hotspot
   service in an airport and the hotspot service provider has a roaming
   agreement with the business person's cellular provider.  In that
   case, the hotspot network is acting as the serving network access
   provider, and the cellular network is acting as the access service
   authorizer.  When the business person moves from the hotspot network
   to the cellular network, the cellular network is both the home access
   service provider and the access service authorizer.

   Mobility service using Mobile IPv6 is conceptually and possibly also
   in practice separate from network access service, though of course
   network access is required prior to providing mobility.  Mobile IPv6
   service enables an IPv6 host to maintain its reachability despite
   changing its network attachment point (subnets).  A network operator
   providing Mobile IPv6 service is called a mobility service provider
   (MSP).  Granting Mobile IPv6 service requires that a host
   authenticate and prove authorization for the service.  A network
   operator that authenticates a mobile node and authorizes mobility
   service is called a mobility service authorizer (MSA).  If both types
   of operation are performed by the same operator, that operator is
   called a home mobility service provider.  If authentication and
   authorization is provided by one operator and the actual service is
   provided by another, the operator providing the service is called the
   serving mobility service provider.  The serving MSP must contact the
   mobile node's mobility service authorizer to check the mobile node's
   authorization prior to granting mobility service.

   The service model defined here clearly separates the entity providing
   the service from the entity that authenticates and authorizes the
   service.  In the case of basic network access, this supports the
   traditional and well-known roaming model, in which inter-operator
   roaming agreements allow a host to obtain network access in areas
   where their home network access provider does not have coverage.  In
   the case of mobility service, this allows a roaming mobile node to
   obtain mobility service in the local operator's network while having
   that service authorized by the home operator.  The service model also
   allows mobility service and network access service to be provided by
   different entities.  This allows a network operator with no wireless
   access, such as, for example, an enterprise network operator, to
   deploy a Mobile IPv6 home agent for mobility service while the actual
   wireless network access is provided by the serving network access
   providers with which the enterprise operator has a contract.  Here
   are some other possible combinations of ASPs and MSPs:

   o  The serving ASP might be the home ASP.  Similarly, the serving MSP
      might be the home MSP.

   o  The home ASP and the home MSP may be the same operator, or not.
      When they are the same, the same set of credentials may be used
      for both services.

   o  The serving ASP and the serving MSP may be the same operator, or
      not.

   o  It is possible that serving ASP and home MSP are the same
      operator.

   Similarly the home ASP and serving MSP may be the same.  Also, the
   ASA and MSA may be the same.

   These entities and all combinations that are reasonable from a
   deployment perspective must be taken into consideration to solve the
   Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping problem.  They impact home agent discovery,
   home address configuration, and mobile node-to-home agent
   authentication aspects.

7.  Deployment Scenarios

   This section describes the various network deployment scenarios.  The
   various combinations of service providers described in Section 6 are
   considered.

   For each scenario, the underlying assumptions are described.  The
   basic assumption is that there is a trust relationship between mobile
   user and the MSA.  Typically, this trust relationship is between the
   mobile user and AAA in the MSA's network.  Seed information needed to
   bootstrap the mobile node is considered in two cases:

   o  AAA authentication is mandatory for network access.

   o  AAA authentication is not part of network access.

   The seed information is described further in Section 8.

7.1.  Mobility Service Subscription Scenario

   Many commercial deployments are based on the assumption that mobile
   nodes have a subscription with a service provider.  In this scenario
   the MN has a subscription with an MSA, also called the home MSP, for
   Mobile IPv6 service.  As stated in Section 6, the MSP is responsible
   for setting up a home agent on a subnet that acts as a Mobile IPv6
   home link.  As a consequence, the home MSP should explicitly
   authorize and control the whole bootstrapping procedure.

   Since the MN is assumed to have a pre-established trust relationship
   with its home provider, it must be configured with an identity and
   credentials; for instance, an NAI and a shared secret by some out-
   of-band means (i.e., manual configuration) before bootstrapping.

   In order to guarantee ubiquitous service, the MN should be able to
   bootstrap MIPv6 operations with its home MSP from any possible access
   location, such as an open network or a network managed by an ASP,
   that may be different from the MSP and that may not have any pre-
   established trust relationship with it.

7.2.  Integrated ASP Network Scenario

   In this scenario, the ASA and MSA are the same entity.  The MN has
   security credentials for access to the network, and these credentials
   can also be used to bootstrap MIPv6.

   Figure 1 describes an AAA design example for integrated ASP scenario.

                     +----------------------------+
                     | IASP(ASA+MSA)              |
        +----+    +-----+         +----+          |
        | MN |--- | NAS |         | HA |          |
        +----+    +-----+         +----+          |
                     | \            \             |
                     |  \ +------+   \ +-------+  |
                     |   -|AAA-NA|    -|AAA-MIP|  |
                     |    +------+     +-------+  |
                     +----------------------------+

             NAS: Network Access Server
             AAA-NA: AAA for network access
             AAA-MIP: AAA for Mobile IP service

           Figure 1.  Integrated ASP network

7.3.  Third-Party MSP Scenario

   Mobility service has traditionally been provided by the same entity
   that authenticates and authorizes the subscriber for network access.
   This is certainly the only model supported by the base Mobile IPv6
   specification.

   In the third-party mobility service provider scenario, the
   subscription for mobility service is made with one entity (the MSA,
   is for instance, a corporate), but the actual mobility service is
   provided by yet another entity (such as an operator specializing in
   this service, the serving MSP).  These two entities have a trust
   relationship.  Transitive trust among the mobile node and these two
   entities may be used to assure the participants that they are dealing
   with trustworthy peers.

   This arrangement is similar to the visited - home operator roaming
   arrangement for network access.

   Figure 2 describes an example of a network for the third-party MSP
   scenario.

                +--------------+   +--------+
                |              |   |Serving |
                | ASP          |   | MSP    |
   +----+    +-----+           |   | +----+ |
   | MN |--- | NAS |           |   | | HA | |  +-------------------+
   +----+    +-----+           |===| +----+ |  | MSA               |
                | \            |   |    \   || (e.g., corporate NW)|
                |  \ +------+  |   |     \     | +-------+         |
                |   -|AAA-NA|  |   |      -------|AAA-MIP|         |
                |    +------+  |   |        |  | +-------+         |
                +------------  +   +--------+  +-------------------+

           Figure 2.  Third-Party MSP network

7.4.  Infrastructure-less Scenario

   Infrastructure refers to network entities like AAA, Public-Key
   Infrastructure (PKI), and Home Location Register (HLR).
   "Infrastructure-less" implies that there is no dependency on any
   elements in the network with which the user has any form of trust
   relationship.

   In such a scenario, there is absolutely no relationship between host
   and infrastructure.

   A good example of infrastructure-less environment for MIPv6
   bootstrapping is the IETF network at IETF meetings.  It is possible
   that there could be MIP6 service available on this network (i.e., a
   MIPv6 HA).  However, there is not really any AAA infrastructure or,
   for that matter, any trust relationship that a user attending the
   meeting has with any entity in the network.

   This specific scenario is not supported in this document.  The reason
   for this is described in Section 9.

8.  Parameters for Authentication

   The following is a list of parameters that are used as the seed for
   the bootstrapping procedure.  The parameters vary depending on
   whether authentication for network access is independent of
   authentication for mobility services.  If different client identities
   are used for network access and mobility services, authentication for
   network access is independent of authentication for mobility
   services.

   o  Parameter Set 1

      In this case, authentication for network access is independent of
      authentication for mobility services.

      If the home agent address is not known to the mobile node, the
      following parameter is needed for discovering the home agent
      address:

      *  The domain name or Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) of the
         home agent

      This parameter may be derived in various ways, such as (but not
      limited to) static configuration, use of the domain name from the
      network access NAI (even if AAA for network access is not
      otherwise used), or use of the domain name of the serving ASP,
      where the domain name may be obtained via DHCP in the serving ASP.

      If the home agent address is not known but the home subnet prefix
      is known, Dynamic Home Agent Address Discovery of Mobile IPv6 may
      be used for discovering the home agent address, and the above
      parameter may not be used.

      When the home agent address is known to the mobile node, the
      following parameter is needed for performing mutual authentication
      between the mobile node and the home agent by using IKE:

      *  IKE credentials (*)

      In the case where the home agent does not have the entire set of
      IKE credentials, the home agent may communicate with another
      entity (for example, an AAA server) to perform mutual
      authentication in IKE.  In such a case, the IKE credentials
      include the credentials used between the mobile node and the other
      entity.  In the case where an AAA protocol is used for the
      communication between the home agent and the other entity during
      the IKE procedure, AAA for Mobile IPv6 service may be involved in
      IKE.  If the authentication protocol [RFC4285] is used, the shared
      key-based security association with the home agent is needed.

   o  Parameter Set 2

      In this case, some dependency exists between authentication for
      network access and authentication for mobility services in that a
      security association that is established as a result of
      authentication for network access is re-used for authentication
      for mobility services.

      All required information, including IKE credentials, is
      bootstrapped from the following parameter:

      *  Network access credentials(*)

   (*) A pair of an NAI and a pre-shared secret is an example of a set
   of credentials.  A pair of an NAI and a public key, which may be
   provided as a digital certificate, is another example of a set of
   credentials.

9.  Security Considerations

   There are two aspects of security for the Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping
   problem:

   1.  The security requirements imposed on the outcome of the
       bootstrapping process by RFC 3775 and other RFCs used by Mobile
       IPv6 for security.

   2.  The security of the bootstrapping process itself, in the sense of
       threats to the bootstrapping process imposed by active or passive
       attackers.

   Note that the two are related; if the bootstrapping process is
   compromised, the level of security required by RFC 3775 may not be
   achieved.

   The following two sections discuss these issues.

9.1.  Security Requirements of Mobile IPv6

   The Mobile IPv6 specification in RFC 3775 requires the establishment
   of a collection of IPsec SAs between the home agent and mobile node
   to secure the signaling traffic for Mobile IP, and, optionally, also
   to secure data traffic.  The security of an IPsec SA required by the
   relevant IPsec RFCs must be quite strong.  Provisioning of keys and
   other cryptographic material during the establishment of the SA
   through bootstrapping must be done in a manner such that authenticity
   is proved and confidentiality is ensured.  In addition, the
   generation of any keying material or other cryptographic material for
   the SA must be done in a way such that the probability of compromise
   after the SA is in place is minimized.  The best way to minimize the
   probability of such a compromise is to have the cryptographic
   material only known or calculable by the two end nodes that share the
   SA -- in this case, the home agent and mobile node.  If other parties
   are involved in establishing the SA (through key distribution, for
   example) the process should follow the constraints designed to
   provide equivalent security.

   RFC 3775 also requires a trust relationship, as defined in Section
   1.3, between the mobile node and its home agent(s).  This is
   necessary, for instance, to ensure that fraudulent mobile nodes that
   attempt to flood other mobile nodes with traffic be not only shut off
   but tracked down.  An infrastructureless relationship as defined in
   Section 1.3 does not satisfy this requirement.  Any bootstrapping
   solution must include a trust relationship between mobile node and
   mobility service provider.  Solutions that depend on an
   infrastructureless relationship are out of scope for bootstrapping.

   Another requirement is that a home address be authorized to one
   specific host at a time.  RFC 3775 requires this so that misbehaving
   mobile nodes can be shut down.  This implies that, in addition to the
   IPsec SA, the home agent must somehow authorize the mobile node for a
   home address.  The authorization can be either implicit (for example,
   as a side effect of the authentication for mobility service) or
   explicit.  The authorization can either be done at the time the SA is
   created or be dynamically managed through a first come, first served
   allocation policy.

9.2.  Threats to the Bootstrapping Process

   Various attacks are possible on the bootstrapping process itself.
   These attacks can compromise the process such that the RFC 3775
   requirements for Mobile IP security are not met, or they can serve
   simply to disrupt the process such that bootstrapping cannot be
   completed.  Here are some possible attacks:

   o  An attacking network entity purporting to offer the mobile node a
      legitimate home agent address or bootstrapping for the IPsec SAs
      may instead offer a bogus home agent address or configure bogus
      SAs that allow the home agent to steal the mobile node's traffic
      or otherwise disrupt the mobile node's mobility service.

   o  An attacking mobile node may attempt to steal mobility service by
      offering up fake credentials to a bootstrapping network entity or
      otherwise disrupting the home agent's ability to offer mobility
      service.

   o  A man in the middle on the link between the mobile node and the
      bootstrapping network entity could steal credentials or other
      sensitive information and use that to steal mobility service or
      deny it to the legitimate owner of the credentials.  Refer to
      Section 7.15 in [RFC3748] and [AAA-EAP-LLA] for further
      information.

   o  An attacker could arrange for a distributed denial-of-service
      attack on the bootstrapping entity, to disrupt legitimate users
      from bootstrapping.

   In addition to these attacks, there are other considerations that are
   important in achieving a good security design.  As mobility and
   network access authentication are separate services, keys generated
   for these services need to be cryptographically separate, to be
   separately named, and to have separate lifetimes.  This needs to be
   achieved even though the keys are generated from the same
   authentication credentials.  This is necessary because a mobile node
   must be able to move from one serving (or roaming) network access
   provider to another without needing to change its mobility access
   provider.  Finally, basic cryptographic processes must provide for
   multiple algorithms in order to accommodate the widely varying
   deployment needs; the need for replacement of algorithms when attacks
   become possible must also be considered in the design.

10.  Contributors

   This contribution is a joint effort of the problem statement design
   team of the Mobile IPv6 WG.  The contributors include Basavaraj
   Patil, Gerardo Giaretta, Jari Arkko, James Kempf, Yoshihiro Ohba,
   Ryuji Wakikawa, Hiroyuki Ohnishi, Mayumi Yanagiya Samita Chakrabarti,
   Gopal Dommety, Kent Leung, Alper Yegin, Hannes Tschofenig, Vijay
   Devarapalli, and Kuntal Chowdury.

   The design team members can be reached at the following email
   addresses:

   Basavaraj Patil: basavaraj.patil@nokia.com

   Gerardo Giaretta: gerardo.giaretta@telecomitalia.it

   Jari Arkko: jari.arkko@kolumbus.fi

   James Kempf: kempf@docomolabs-usa.com

   Yoshihiro Ohba: yohba@tari.toshiba.com

   Ryuji Wakikawa: ryuji@sfc.wide.ad.jp

   Hiroyuki Ohnishi: ohnishi.hiroyuki@lab.ntt.co.jp

   Mayumi Yanagiya: yanagiya.mayumi@lab.ntt.co.jp

   Samita Chakrabarti: Samita.Chakrabarti@eng.sun.com
   Gopal Dommety: gdommety@cisco.com

   Kent Leung: kleung@cisco.com

   Alper Yegin: alper.yegin@samsung.com

   Hannes Tschofenig: hannes.tschofenig@siemens.com

   Vijay Devarapalli: vijayd@iprg.nokia.com

   Kuntal Chowdhury: kchowdhury@starentnetworks.com

11.  Acknowledgements

   Special thanks to James Kempf and Jari Arkko for writing the initial
   version of the bootstrapping statement.  Thanks to John Loughney and
   T.J. Kniveton for their detailed reviews.

12.  Informative References

   [RFC3748]     Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and
                 H. Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol
                 (EAP)", RFC 3748, June 2004.

   [AAA-EAP-LLA] Mariblanca, D., "EAP lower layer attributes for AAA
                 protocols", Work in Progress, May 2004.

   [RFC2794]     Calhoun, P. and C. Perkins, "Mobile IP Network Access
                 Identifier Extension for IPv4", RFC 2794, March 2000.

   [RFC3041]     Narten, T. and R. Draves, "Privacy Extensions for
                 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 3041,
                 January 2001.

   [RFC3753]     Manner, J. and M. Kojo, "Mobility Related Terminology",
                 RFC 3753, June 2004.

   [RFC3775]     Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility
                 Support in IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.

   [RFC3776]     Galvin, J., "IAB and IESG Selection, Confirmation, and
                 Recall Process: Operation of the Nominating and Recall
                 Committees", BCP 10, RFC 3777, June 2004.

   [RFC4283]     Patel, A., Leung, K., Khalil, M., Akhtar, H., and K.
                 Chowdhury, "Mobile Node Identifier Option for Mobile
                 IPv6 (MIPv6)", RFC 4283, November 2005.

   [RFC4285]     Patel, A., Leung, K., Khalil, M., Akhtar, H., and K.
                 Chowdhury, "Authentication Protocol for Mobile IPv6",
                 RFC 4285, January 2006.

Authors' Addresses

   Alpesh Patel
   Cisco
   170 W. Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA  95134
   USA

   Phone: +1 408 853 9580
   EMail: alpesh@cisco.com


   Gerardo Giaretta
   Telecom Italia
   via Reiss Romoli 274
   Torino  10148
   Italy

   Phone: +39 011 228 6904
   EMail: gerardo.giaretta@telecomitalia.it

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