RFC 3097 PROPOSED STANDARD RSVP · MESSAGE TYPES

RSVP Cryptographic Authentication -- Updated Message Type Value

Two RSVP Integrity message types get new numbers to end a clash with the Bundle message.

On rfc-editor.org ↗
PUBLISHED
April 2001
AUTHORS
R. Braden, L. Zhang
STREAM
IETF
BUILDS ON
RFC 2747 — RSVP Cryptographic Authentication
BUNDLE MESSAGE TYPE
12
CHALLENGE MESSAGE TYPE
25
INTEGRITY RESPONSE MESSAGE TYPE
26 (25+1)
COOKIE SIZE
32 bits
DOI
10.17487/RFC3097

RFC text

Contents
Original text · RFC Editor View on rfc-editor.org ↗
Network Working Group                                          R. Braden
Request for Comments: 3097                                           ISI
Updates: 2747                                                   L. Zhang
Category: Standards Track                                           UCLA
                                                              April 2001


                  RSVP Cryptographic Authentication --
                       Updated Message Type Value

Status of this Memo

   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   This memo resolves a duplication in the assignment of RSVP Message
   Types, by changing the Message Types assigned by RFC 2747 to
   Challenge and Integrity Response messages.

1. Introduction

   RFC 2747 ("RSVP Cryptographic Authentication") [RFC2747] assigns RSVP
   Message Type 12 to an Integrity Response message, while RFC 2961
   ("RSVP Refresh Overhead Reduction Extensions") [RFC2961] assigns the
   same value to a Bundle message.  This memo resolves the conflict over
   RSVP Message Type 12 by assigning a different value to the Message
   Type of the Integrity Response Message in RFC 2747.  It is believed
   that the protocol defined by RFC 2961 entered use in the field before
   the RFC's publication and before the conflicting Message Type was
   noticed, and that it may be easier to install new software in
   environments that have deployed the Integrity object than in those
   that have deployed the refresh reduction extension.

   To simplify possible interoperability problems caused by this change,
   we also assign a new value to the Message Type of RFC 2747's
   Challenge message, to which the Integrity Response message is a
   reply.

2. Modification

   Message Types defined in the RSVP Integrity extension [RFC 2747]
   shall be changed as follows:

      o Challenge message has Message Type 25.
      o Integrity Response message has Message Type 25+1.

3. Compatibility

   Two communicating nodes whose Integrity implementations are
   conformant with this modification will interoperate, using Message
   Type 12 for Bundle messages and Message Types 25 and 26 for the
   Integrity handshake.  A non-conformant implementation of the
   Integrity extension will not interoperate with a conformant
   implementation (though two non-conformant implementations can
   interoperate as before).

   There is no possibility of an Integrity handshake succeeding
   accidentally due to this change, since both sides of the handshake
   use the new numbers or the old numbers.  Furthermore, the Integrity
   Response message includes a 32-bit cookie that must match a cookie in
   the Challenge message, else the challenge will fail.  Finally, a
   non-conformant implementation should never receive a Bundle message
   that it interprets as an Integrity Response message, since RFC 2961
   requires that Bundle messages be sent only to a Bundle-capable node.

4. References

   [RFC2747]  Baker, F., Lindell, R. and M. Talwar, "RSVP Cryptographic
              Authentication", RFC 2747, January 2000.

   [RFC2961]  Berger, L., Gan, D., Swallow, G., Pan, P., Tommasi, F.
              and S. Molendini, "RSVP Refresh Overhead Reduction
              Extensions", RFC 2961, April 2001.

Security Considerations

   No new security considerations are introduced beyond RFC 2747 itself
   and the compatibility issues above.

Authors' Addresses

   Bob Braden
   USC Information Sciences Institute
   4676 Admiralty Way
   Marina del Rey, CA 90292

   Phone: (310) 822-1511
   EMail: Braden@ISI.EDU


   Lixia Zhang
   UCLA Computer Science Department
   4531G Boelter Hall
   Los Angeles, CA 90095-1596 USA

   Phone: 310-825-2695
   EMail: lixia@cs.ucla.edu

Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001).  All Rights Reserved.

   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
   kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
   included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
   document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
   the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
   Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
   developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
   copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
   followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
   English.

   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
   revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.

   This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
   TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
   BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
   HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
   MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Acknowledgement

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.

AI ELI5

On this page
PROBLEMRFC 2747 gave RSVP Message Type 12 to the Integrity Response message, but RFC 2961 gave the same value to the Bundle message.
MECHANISMThis memo changes the Challenge message to Message Type 25 and the Integrity Response message to 25+1, leaving 12 for Bundle.
THE CATCHConformant nodes interoperate using 12 for Bundle and 25 and 26 for the Integrity handshake. Non-conformant ones do not interoperate with them.

§1The Clash Over Type 12

RFC 2747 (RSVP Cryptographic Authentication) assigns RSVP Message Type 12 to an Integrity Response message. RFC 2961 (RSVP Refresh Overhead Reduction Extensions) assigns the same value to a Bundle message.

The memo resolves this by changing the Integrity Response number. It gives the reasoning: the refresh reduction protocol is believed to have entered use in the field before its publication and before the conflict was noticed, and installing new software may be easier where the Integrity object is deployed than where the refresh reduction extension is.

Two messages wore the same number tag. The one that fewer people use agrees to change its tag.

§2The Modification

The Message Types defined in the RSVP Integrity extension of RFC 2747 are changed as follows: the Challenge message has Message Type 25, and the Integrity Response message has Message Type 25+1, that is 26.

The Challenge message is renumbered as well, to simplify possible interoperability problems, since the Integrity Response is a reply to it.

The question and its answer both get new numbers, 25 and 26, so they stay matched as a pair.

RSVP MESSAGE TYPES AFTER RFC 3097
MessageMessage Type
Bundle (RFC 2961)12
Challenge (RFC 2747) THIS RFC25
Integrity Response (RFC 2747) THIS RFC26 (25+1)

§3Compatibility

Two conformant nodes interoperate, using type 12 for Bundle and types 25 and 26 for the Integrity handshake. A non-conformant implementation will not interoperate with a conformant one, although two non-conformant implementations can interoperate as before.

A handshake cannot succeed by accident, because both sides use either the new numbers or the old ones. The Integrity Response also includes a 32-bit cookie that must match the Challenge, or the challenge fails. A non-conformant node should never see a Bundle message as an Integrity Response, because RFC 2961 requires Bundle messages be sent only to Bundle-capable nodes.

Updated devices understand each other. An old device only works with another old one, and mix-ups are caught by a matching secret number.

§4References