RFC 9906 PROPOSED STANDARD DNS SECURITY · CRYPTOGRAPHY · DEPRECATION
ECC-GOST in DNSSEC: Deprecate Usage of ECC-GOST within DNSSEC
Removes support for deprecated GOST algorithms from DNSSEC.
RFC EDITOR
Hardaker, W. and W. Kumari, "Deprecate Usage of ECC-GOST within DNSSEC", RFC 9906, DOI 10.17487/RFC9906, November 2025, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9906>.
BIBTEX
@misc{rfc9906,
series = {Request for Comments},
number = 9906,
howpublished = {RFC 9906},
publisher = {RFC Editor},
doi = {10.17487/RFC9906},
url = {https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9906},
author = {W. Hardaker and W. Kumari},
title = {{Deprecate Usage of ECC-GOST within DNSSEC}},
pagetotal = 5,
year = 2025,
month = nov,
} RFC text
Contents
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) W. Hardaker
Request for Comments: 9906 USC/ISI
Category: Standards Track W. Kumari
ISSN: 2070-1721 Google
November 2025
Deprecate Usage of ECC-GOST within DNSSEC
Abstract
This document retires the use of GOST R 34.10-2001 (mnemonic "ECC-
GOST") and GOST R 34.11-94 within DNSSEC.
RFC 5933 (Historic) defined the use of GOST R 34.10-2001 and GOST R
34.11-94 algorithms with DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC). This
document updates RFC 5933 by deprecating the use of ECC-GOST.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9906.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
1.1. Requirements Notation
2. Deprecating ECC-GOST Algorithms in DNSSEC
3. Security Considerations
4. Operational Considerations
5. IANA Considerations
6. References
6.1. Normative References
6.2. Informative References
Acknowledgments
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
The GOST R 34.10-2001 and GOST R 34.11-94 algorithms are documented
in [RFC5933] and their use with DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) is
further described in [RFC9364]. These two algorithms were deprecated
by the Orders of the Federal Agency for Technical Regulation and
Metrology of Russia (Rosstandart) in August 2012 and were superseded
by GOST 34.10-2012 and GOST 34.11-2012, respectively. The use of
these two newer algorithms in DNSSEC is documented in [RFC9558], and
their associated requirement levels are not changed by this document.
Thus, the use of GOST R 34.10-2001 (mnemonic "ECC-GOST") and GOST R
34.11-94 is no longer recommended for use in DNSSEC [RFC9364].
1.1. Requirements Notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Deprecating ECC-GOST Algorithms in DNSSEC
The GOST R 34.11-94 algorithm [RFC5933] MUST NOT be used when
creating Delegation Signer (DS) records. Validating resolvers MUST
treat GOST R 34.11-94 DS records as insecure. If no other DS records
of accepted cryptographic algorithms are available, the DNS records
below the delegation point MUST be treated as insecure.
The GOST R 34.10-2001 algorithm [RFC5933] (mnemonic "ECC-GOST") MUST
NOT be used when creating DNS Public Key (DNSKEY) and Resource Record
Signature (RRSIG) records. Validating resolvers MUST treat RRSIG
records created from DNSKEY records using these algorithms as
unsupported algorithms. If no other RRSIG records of accepted
cryptographic algorithms are available, the validating resolver MUST
consider the associated resource records as insecure.
3. Security Considerations
This document potentially increases the security of the DNSSEC
ecosystem by deprecating algorithms that are no longer recommended
for use.
4. Operational Considerations
This document removes support for ECC-GOST. Zone operators currently
making use of ECC-GOST-based algorithms should switch to algorithms
that remain supported. DNS registries should prohibit their clients
from uploading and publishing ECC-GOST-based DS records to ensure
that they are using algorithms that are supported by DNSSEC
validators and thus can be DNSSEC validated.
5. IANA Considerations
IANA has updated the GOST R 34.10-2001 (12) entry in the "DNS
Security Algorithm Numbers" registry [DNSKEY-IANA] [RFC9904] as
follows:
Number: 12
Description: GOST R 34.10-2001 (DEPRECATED)
Mnemonic: ECC-GOST
Zone Signing: Y
Trans. Sec.: *
Use for DNSSEC Signing: MUST NOT
Use for DNSSEC Validation: MUST NOT
Implement for DNSSEC Signing: MUST NOT
Implement for DNSSEC Validation: MUST NOT
Reference: [RFC5933], Change the status of GOST Signature Algorithms
in DNSSEC in the IETF stream to Historic
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/status-change-gost-dnssec-to-
historic/), and RFC 9906
Note: The "Use for DNSSEC Signing" and "Implement for DNSSEC
Delegation" columns were already set to MUST NOT.
IANA has updated the GOST R 34.11-94 (3) entry in the "Digest
Algorithms" registry [DS-IANA] as follows:
Value: 3
Description: GOST R 34.11-94 (DEPRECATED)
Use for DNSSEC Delegation: MUST NOT
Use for DNSSEC Validation: MUST NOT
Implement for DNSSEC Delegation: MUST NOT
Implement for DNSSEC Validation: MUST NOT
Reference: [RFC5933], Change the status of GOST Signature Algorithms
in DNSSEC in the IETF stream to Historic
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/status-change-gost-dnssec-to-
historic/), and RFC 9906
Note: The "Use for DNSSEC Signing" and "Implement for DNSSEC
Delegation" columns were already set to MUST NOT.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[DNSKEY-IANA]
IANA, "DNS Security Algorithm Numbers",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers>.
[DS-IANA] IANA, "Digest Algorithms",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5933] Dolmatov, V., Ed., Chuprina, A., and I. Ustinov, "Use of
GOST Signature Algorithms in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource
Records for DNSSEC", RFC 5933, DOI 10.17487/RFC5933, July
2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5933>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC9364] Hoffman, P., "DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)", BCP 237,
RFC 9364, DOI 10.17487/RFC9364, February 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9364>.
[RFC9904] Hardaker, W. and W. Kumari, "DNSSEC Cryptographic
Algorithm Recommendation Update Process", RFC 9904,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9904, November 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9904>.
6.2. Informative References
[RFC9558] Makarenko, B. and V. Dolmatov, Ed., "Use of GOST 2012
Signature Algorithms in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records
for DNSSEC", RFC 9558, DOI 10.17487/RFC9558, April 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9558>.
Acknowledgments
The authors appreciate the comments and suggestions from the
following IETF participants in helping produce this document: Mark
Andrews, Steve Crocker, Brian Dickson, Peter Dickson, Thomas Graf,
Paul Hoffman, Russ Housely, Shumon Huque, S. Moonesamy, Peter
Thomassen, Stefan Ubbink, Tim Wicinski, Paul Wouters, and the many
members of the DNSOP Working Group that discussed this specification.
Authors' Addresses
Wes Hardaker
USC/ISI
Email: ietf@hardakers.net
Warren Kumari
Google
Email: warren@kumari.net
AI ELI5
On this page
PROBLEMRFC 5933 introduced two Russian-standard cryptographic algorithms (GOST R 34.10-2001 and GOST R 34.11-94) for DNSSEC, but these were officially deprecated by Russia in 2012 and have no real-world deployment in DNSSEC.
MECHANISMRFC 9906 marks these algorithms as DEPRECATED in the IANA registries and mandates that DNSSEC implementations must not use them for signing or validation, and must treat records using them as insecure.
WHY IT MATTERSDNSSEC validators no longer recognize ECC-GOST signatures, and zone operators are discouraged from using these obsolete algorithms, improving the overall security posture of DNSSEC.
§1End of Life for GOST in DNSSEC
DNSSEC signs DNS records to prove they are authentic. RFC 5933 defined two Russian cryptographic standards for this: GOST R 34.10-2001 (a signature algorithm, mnemonic ECC-GOST) and GOST R 34.11-94 (a digest algorithm). These were added in 2010 to support Russian and CIS networks.
However, the Russian standards authority (Rosstandart) officially deprecated both algorithms in August 2012 in favor of newer versions (GOST 2012). GOST ECC-GOST has never seen significant deployment in DNSSEC and was already marked as not recommended.
An old signing method was added to DNS in 2010, but Russia retired it in 2012. It never really caught on, and everyone moved to better methods.
§2Deprecation and Mandatory Non-Use
RFC 9906 updates the IANA DNS Security Algorithm Numbers registry and the Digest Algorithms registry to mark both algorithms as DEPRECATED. More importantly, it imposes hard requirements:
GOST R 34.11-94MUST NOT be used to create new Delegation Signer (DS) records, and validating resolvers MUST treat DS records using it as insecure.GOST R 34.10-2001MUST NOT be used to create DNSKEY or RRSIG records, and validators MUST treat such records as unsupported.
These rules prevent reliance on obsolete algorithms while allowing existing records to be treated gracefully (as insecure rather than as validation failures).
From now on, you must not sign DNS with GOST. If someone gives you a GOST signature, treat it like it's not there and use something else.
§3Migration Path
Zone operators currently using ECC-GOST must switch to supported algorithms (such as RSASSA-PKIX or ECDSA). DNS registries should block their customers from uploading GOST DS records. This RFC does not make GOST validation a hard error (which would break zones accidentally signed with GOST), but instead treats GOST as absent, allowing zones with multiple DS records to fall back to other algorithms.
If your zone uses GOST signatures, change them now to modern algorithms. Registries will stop accepting GOST DS records.
§4References
[RFC5933]RFC 5933Dolmatov, V., Ed., Chuprina, A., and I. Ustinov, "Use of GOST Signature Algorithms in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC", RFC 5933, DOI 10.17487/RFC5933, July 2010.July 2010[RFC9364]RFC 9364Hoffman, P., "DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)", BCP 237, RFC 9364, DOI 10.17487/RFC9364, February 2023.February 2023[RFC9558]RFC 9558Makarenko, B. and V. Dolmatov, Ed., "Use of GOST 2012 Signature Algorithms in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC", RFC 9558, DOI 10.17487/RFC9558, April 2024.April 2024