PANA Pre-Authentication: Pre-Authentication Support for the Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                           Y. Ohba
Request for Comments: 5873                                       Toshiba
Category: Experimental                                          A. Yegin
ISSN: 2070-1721                                                  Samsung
                                                                May 2010

            Pre-Authentication Support for the Protocol for
           Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)

Abstract

   This document defines an extension to the Protocol for Carrying
   Authentication for Network Access (PANA) for proactively establishing
   a PANA Security Association between a PANA Client in one access
   network and a PANA Authentication Agent in another access network to
   which the PANA Client may move.

Status of This Memo

   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
   published for examination, experimental implementation, and
   evaluation.

   This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet
   community.  This document is a product of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  It has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents
   approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
   Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5873.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
     1.1.  Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  Pre-Authentication Procedure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   4.  PANA Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   5.  Backward Compatibility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   8.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

1.  Introduction

   The Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)
   [RFC5191] carries Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) messages
   between a PANA Client (PaC) and a PANA Authentication Agent (PAA) in
   the access network.  If the PaC is a mobile device and is capable of
   moving from one access network to another while running its
   applications, it is critical for the PaC to perform a handover
   seamlessly without degrading the performance of the applications
   during the handover period.  When the handover requires the PaC to
   establish a PANA session with the PAA in the new access network, the
   signaling to establish the PANA session should be completed as fast
   as possible.  See [RFC5836] for the handover latency requirements.

   This document defines an extension to the PANA protocol [RFC5191]
   used for proactively executing EAP authentication and establishing a
   PANA SA (Security Association) between a PaC in an access network and
   a PAA in another access network to which the PaC may move.  The
   extension to the PANA protocol is designed to realize direct
   pre-authentication defined in [RFC5836].  How to realize
   authorization and accounting with the use of the pre-authentication
   extension is out of the scope of this document.

1.1.  Specification of Requirements

   In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
   of the specification.  These words are often capitalized.  The key
   words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
   "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document
   are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  Terminology

   The following terms are used in this document, in addition to the
   terms defined in [RFC5191].

   Serving Network:  The access network to which the host is currently
      attached.

   Candidate Network:  An access network that is a potential target of
      the host's handover.

   Serving PAA (SPAA):  A PAA that resides in the serving network and
      provides network access authentication for a particular PaC.

   Candidate PAA (CPAA):  A PAA that resides in a candidate network to
      which the PaC may move.  A CPAA for a particular PaC may be a SPAA
      for another PaC.

   Pre-authentication:  Pre-authentication refers to EAP
      pre-authentication and is defined as the utilization of EAP to
      pre-establish EAP keying material on an authenticator prior to
      arrival of the peer at the access network served by that
      authenticator [RFC5836].  In this document, EAP pre-authentication
      is performed between a PaC and a CPAA.

3.  Pre-Authentication Procedure

   A PaC that supports pre-authentication may establish a PANA session
   for each CPAA.

   There may be several mechanisms for a PaC to discover a CPAA.  An IP
   address of the discovered CPAA is the output of those mechanisms.
   PANA pre-authentication is performed between the PaC and CPAA using
   the discovered IP address of the CPAA.  IEEE 802.21 [802.21]
   Information Service MAY be used as a CPAA discovery mechanism.

   There may be a number of criteria for CPAA selection, the timing to
   start pre-authentication, and the timing as to when the CPAA becomes
   the SPAA.  Such criteria can be implementation-specific and thus are
   outside the scope of this document.

   Pre-authentication is initiated by a PaC in a way similar to normal
   authentication.  A new 'E' (prE-authentication) bit is defined in the
   PANA header.  When pre-authentication is performed, the 'E'
   (prE-authentication) bit of PANA messages is set in order to indicate
   that this PANA run is for pre-authentication.  Use of
   pre-authentication is negotiated as follows.

   o  When a PaC initiates pre-authentication, it sends a PANA-Client-
      Initiation (PCI) message with the 'E' (prE-authentication) bit
      set.  The CPAA responds with a PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) message
      with the 'S' (Start) and 'E' (prE-authentication) bits set only if
      it supports pre-authentication.  Otherwise, the 'E'
      (prE-authentication) bit of the PAR message will be cleared
      according to Section 6.2 of [RFC5191], which results in a
      negotiation failure.

   o  Once the PaC and CPAA have successfully negotiated on performing
      pre-authentication using the 'S' (Start) and 'E'
      (prE-authentication) bits, the subsequent PANA messages exchanged
      between them MUST have the 'E' (prE-authentication) bit set until
      the CPAA becomes the SPAA of the PaC.  The PaC may conduct this
      exchange with more than one CPAA.  If the PaC and CPAA have failed
      to negotiate on performing pre-authentication, the PaC or CPAA
      that sent a message with both the 'S' (Start) and 'E'
      (prE-authentication) bits set MUST discard the message received
      from the peer with 'S' (Start) bit set and the 'E'
      (prE-authentication) bit cleared, which will eventually result in
      PANA session termination.

   If IP reconfiguration is needed in the access network associated with
   the CPAA, the 'I' (IP Reconfiguration) bit in PAR messages used for
   pre-authentication between the PaC and CPAA is also set.  The 'I' (IP
   Reconfiguration) bit in these messages takes effect only after the
   CPAA becomes the SPAA.

   When a CPAA of the PaC becomes the SPAA, e.g., due to movement of the
   PaC, the PaC informs the PAA of the change using PANA-Notification-
   Request (PNR) and PANA-Notification-Answer (PNA) messages with the
   'P' (Ping) bit set and the 'E' (prE-authentication) bit cleared.  The
   'E' (prE-authentication) bit MUST be cleared in subsequent PANA
   messages.

   A PANA SA is required for pre-authentication in order to securely
   associate the PNR/PNA exchange to the earlier authentication.

   The PANA session between the PaC and a CPAA is deleted by entering
   the termination phase of the PANA protocol.

   An example call flow for pre-authentication is shown in Figure 1.
   Note that EAP authentication is performed over PAR and
   PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) exchanges, including the one with the 'C'
   (Complete) bit set.

        PaC                                               CPAA
         |                                                 |
   +------------------+                                    |
   |Pre-authentication|                                    |
   |trigger           |                                    |
   +------------------+                                    |
         |                  PCI w/'E' bit set              |
         |------------------------------------------------>|
         |            PAR w/'S' and 'E' bits set           |
         |<------------------------------------------------|
         |            PAN w/'S' and 'E' bits set           |
         |------------------------------------------------>|
         |           PAR-PAN exchange w/'E' bit set        |
         |<----------------------------------------------->|
         |            PAR w/'C' and 'E' bits set           |
         |<------------------------------------------------|
         |            PAN w/'C' and 'E' bits set           |
         |------------------------------------------------>|
         .                        .                        .
         .                        .                        .
   +----------+                                            |
   | Movement |                                            |
   +----------+                                            |
         |        PNR w/ 'P' bit set and w/o 'E' bit set   |
         |------------------------------------------------>|
         |                                        +-----------------+
         |                                        |CPAA becomes SPAA|
         |                                        +-----------------+
         |        PNA w/ 'P' bit set and w/o 'E' bit set   |
         |<------------------------------------------------|
         |                                                 |

                  Figure 1: Pre-Authentication Call Flow

4.  PANA Extensions

   A new 'E' (prE-authentication) bit is defined in the Flags field of
   the PANA header as follows.

    0                   1
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |R S C A P I E r r r r r r r r r|
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   'E' (prE-authentication) bit:  When pre-authentication is performed,
      the 'E' (prE-authentication) bit of PANA messages is set in order
      to indicate whether this PANA run is for pre-authentication.  The
      exact usage of this bit is described in Section 3.  Bit 6 has been
      assigned by IANA.

5.  Backward Compatibility

   Backward compatibility between a PANA entity that does not support
   the pre-authentication extension and another PANA entity that
   supports the pre-authentication extension is maintained as follows.

   When a PaC that supports the pre-authentication extension initiates
   PANA pre-authentication by sending a PCI message with the 'E'
   (prE-authentication) bit set to a PAA that does not support the
   pre-authentication extension, the PAA will ignore the 'E'
   (prE-authentication) bit according to Section 6.2 of [RFC5191], and
   try to process the message as a normal authentication attempt.  As a
   result, the PaC will receive a PAR message with the 'E'
   (prE-authentication) bit cleared.  In this case, the negotiation on
   the use of pre-authentication will fail, and eventually the PANA
   session will be terminated as described in Section 3.

6.  Security Considerations

   This specification is based on the PANA protocol, and it exhibits the
   same security properties, except for one important difference:
   Pre-authenticating PaCs are not physically connected to an access
   network associated with the PAA, but they are connected to some other
   network somewhere else on the Internet.  This distinction can create
   greater denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerability for systems using PANA
   pre-authentication if appropriate measures are not taken.  An
   unprotected PAA can be forced to create state by an attacker PaC that
   merely sends PCI messages.

   [RFC5191] describes how the PAA can stay stateless while responding
   to incoming PCIs.  PAAs using pre-authentication SHOULD be following
   those guidelines (see [RFC5191], Section 4.1).

   Furthermore, it is recommended that PANA pre-authentication messages
   be only accepted from PaCs originating from well-known IP networks
   (e.g., physically adjacent networks) for a given PAA.  These IP
   networks can be used with a whitelist implemented on either the
   firewall protecting the perimeter around the PAA or the PAA itself.
   This prevention measure SHOULD be used whenever it can be practically
   applied to a given deployment.

7.  IANA Considerations

   As described in Section 4, and following the new IANA allocation
   policy on PANA messages [RFC5872], bit 6 of the Flags field of the
   PANA header has been assigned by IANA for the 'E'
   (prE-authentication) bit.

8.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Basavaraj Patil, Ashutosh Dutta,
   Julien Bournelle, Sasikanth Bharadwaj, Subir Das, Rafa Marin Lopez,
   Lionel Morand, Victor Fajardo, Glen Zorn, Qin Wu, Jari Arkko,
   Pasi Eronen, and Joseph Salowey for their support and valuable
   feedback.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC5191]  Forsberg, D., Ohba, Y., Patil, B., Tschofenig, H., and A.
              Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network
              Access (PANA)", RFC 5191, May 2008.

   [RFC5872]  Arkko, J. and A. Yegin, "IANA Rules for the Protocol for
              Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)",
              RFC 5872, May 2010.

9.2.  Informative References

   [RFC5836]  Ohba, Y., Ed., Wu, Q., Ed., and G. Zorn, Ed., "Extensible
              Authentication Protocol (EAP) Early Authentication Problem
              Statement", RFC 5836, April 2010.

   [802.21]   IEEE, "Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks:
              Media Independent Handover Services", LAN MAN Standards
              Committee of the IEEE Computer Society 802.21, 2008.

Authors' Addresses

   Yoshihiro Ohba
   Toshiba Corporate Research and Development Center
   1 Komukai-Toshiba-cho
   Saiwai-ku, Kawasaki, Kanagawa  212-8582
   Japan

   Phone: +81 44 549 2230
   EMail: yoshihiro.ohba@toshiba.co.jp


   Alper Yegin
   Samsung
   Istanbul
   Turkey

   EMail: alper.yegin@yegin.org