SCRAM LDAP Schema: Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) Schema for Storing Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism (SCRAM) Secrets
How an LDAP directory can store the secrets a server needs to check SCRAM logins.
Melnikov, A., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) Schema for Storing Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism (SCRAM) Secrets", RFC 5803, DOI 10.17487/RFC5803, July 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5803>.
@misc{rfc5803,
series = {Request for Comments},
number = 5803,
howpublished = {RFC 5803},
publisher = {RFC Editor},
doi = {10.17487/RFC5803},
url = {https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5803},
author = {A. Melnikov},
title = {{Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) Schema for Storing Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism (SCRAM) Secrets}},
pagetotal = 4,
year = 2010,
month = jul,
} RFC text
Contents
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) A. Melnikov
Request for Comments: 5803 Isode Limited
Category: Informational July 2010
ISSN: 2070-1721
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) Schema for Storing Salted
Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism (SCRAM) Secrets
Abstract
This memo describes how the "authPassword" Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol (LDAP) attribute can be used for storing secrets used
by the Salted Challenge Response Authentication Message (SCRAM)
mechanism in the Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)
framework.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5803.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Overview ........................................................2
2. Conventions Used in This Document ...............................3
3. Security Considerations .........................................3
4. Acknowledgements ................................................4
5. Normative References ............................................4
1. Overview
This document describes how the authPassword LDAP attribute
[AUTHPASS] can be used for storing secrets used by [SCRAM] Simple
Authentication and Security Layer [RFC4422] Mechanisms.
The "scheme" part of the authPassword attribute is the SCRAM
mechanism name (always without the "-PLUS" suffix), e.g., "SCRAM-
SHA-1". See [SCRAM] for the exact syntax of SCRAM mechanism
names.
The "authInfo" part of the authPassword attribute is the iteration
count (iter-count in the ABNF below), followed by ":" and base64-
encoded [BASE64] salt.
The "authValue" part of the authPassword attribute is the base64-
encoded [BASE64] StoredKey [SCRAM], followed by ":" and base64-
encoded [BASE64] ServerKey [SCRAM].
Syntax of the attribute can be expressed using ABNF [RFC5234]. Non-
terminal references in the following ABNF are defined in either
[AUTHPASS], [RFC4422], or [RFC5234].
scram-mech = "SCRAM-SHA-1" / scram-mech-ext
; Complies with ABNF for <scheme>
; defined in [AUTHPASS].
scram-authInfo = iter-count ":" salt
; Complies with ABNF for <authInfo>
; defined in [AUTHPASS].
scram-authValue = stored-key ":" server-key
; Complies with ABNF for <authValue>
; defined in [AUTHPASS].
iter-count = %x31-39 *DIGIT
; SCRAM iteration count.
; A positive number without leading zeros.
salt = <base64-encoded value>
stored-key = <base64-encoded value>
; See definition in [SCRAM].
server-key = <base64-encoded value>
; See definition in [SCRAM].
scram-mech-ext = "SCRAM-" 1*9mech-char
; Other SCRAM mechanisms registered
; in the IANA registry for SASL
; mechanism names.
mech-char = <Defined in RFC 4422>
Note that the authPassword attribute is multivalued. For example, it
may contain multiple SCRAM hashes for different hashing algorithms.
2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Security Considerations
This document defines how the authPassword attribute can be used to
store SCRAM secrets. Therefore, security considerations relevant to
[SCRAM] and hash functions used with it are also relevant to this
document.
General security considerations related to the authPassword attribute
(as specified in [AUTHPASS]) also apply to the use of authPassword as
specified in this document. In particular, the values of
authPassword SHOULD be protected as if they were cleartext passwords.
A read operation on this attribute that is not protected by a privacy
layer (such as IPsec or TLS) can expose this attribute to an attacker
who a) would be able to use the intercepted value to impersonate the
user to all servers providing SCRAM access using the same hash
function, password, iteration count, and salt or b) would be able to
perform an offline dictionary or brute-force attack in order to
recover the user's password.
Servers MUST validate the format of the authPassword attribute before
using it for performing a SCRAM authentication exchange. It is
possible that an attacker compromised the LDAP server or got access
to the entry containing the attribute in order to exploit a
vulnerability in the subsystem performing the SCRAM authentication
exchange. Big iteration counts and invalid base64 encoding are two
possible (but not the only) exploits in the format specified in the
document.
4. Acknowledgements
The author gratefully acknowledges the feedback provided by Chris
Newman, Kurt Zeilenga, Chris Lonvick, Peter Saint-Andre, Barry Leiba,
and Chris Ridd.
5. Normative References
[AUTHPASS] Zeilenga, K., "LDAP Authentication Password Schema",
RFC 3112, May 2001.
[BASE64] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4422] Melnikov, A. and K. Zeilenga, "Simple Authentication and
Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, June 2006.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.
[SCRAM] Menon-Sen, A., Newman, C., Melnikov, A., and N. Williams,
"Salted Challenge Response Authentication Message (SCRAM)
SASL Mechanisms", RFC 5802, July 2010.
Author's Address
Alexey Melnikov
Isode Limited
5 Castle Business Village
36 Station Road
Hampton, Middlesex TW12 2BX
UK
EMail: alexey.melnikov@isode.com
URI: http://www.melnikov.ca/
AI ELI5
On this page
§1What the RFC Defines
RFC 5803 describes how the authPassword LDAP attribute, defined in RFC 3112, can store the secrets used by the SCRAM SASL mechanisms from RFC 5802.
The attribute is multivalued, so one entry may hold several SCRAM values, for example for different hashing algorithms.
A directory already has a drawer for password-like items. This note says what to put in it for the secret-puzzle login.
§2How the Attribute Is Filled In
The scheme part is the SCRAM mechanism name, always without the -PLUS suffix, for example SCRAM-SHA-1. The authInfo part is the iteration count, then :, then the base64-encoded salt.
The authValue part is the base64-encoded StoredKey, then :, then the base64-encoded ServerKey. The iteration count is a positive number without leading zeros. The RFC gives the grammar in ABNF.
Each record has a label for the recipe, a note on how many times it was mixed and the salt used, and two scrambled keys. Colons separate the pieces.
scram-authInfo = iter-count ":" salt
scram-authValue = stored-key ":" server-key
iter-count = %x31-39 *DIGIT§3Security Considerations
Security considerations of SCRAM and its hash functions also apply, as do those of authPassword. The values SHOULD be protected as if they were cleartext passwords.
A read of the attribute not protected by a privacy layer such as IPsec or TLS can let an attacker impersonate the user to servers using the same hash function, password, iteration count and salt, or run an offline dictionary or brute-force attack to recover the password.
Servers MUST validate the format of the attribute before using it. The RFC names big iteration counts and invalid base64 encoding as two possible exploits.
Even scrambled secrets are valuable, so guard them like the real password and double-check a record looks right before using it.