ECC GCM Cipher Suites: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)
Sixteen TLS cipher suites that pair elliptic curve key exchange with SHA-256/384 and AES-GCM.
Rescorla, E., "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)", RFC 5289, DOI 10.17487/RFC5289, August 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5289>.
@misc{rfc5289,
series = {Request for Comments},
number = 5289,
howpublished = {RFC 5289},
publisher = {RFC Editor},
doi = {10.17487/RFC5289},
url = {https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5289},
author = {E. Rescorla},
title = {{TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)}},
pagetotal = 6,
year = 2008,
month = aug,
} RFC text
Contents
Network Working Group E. Rescorla
Request for Comments: 5289 RTFM, Inc.
Category: Informational August 2008
TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)
Status of This Memo
This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
memo is unlimited.
Abstract
RFC 4492 describes elliptic curve cipher suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS). However, all those cipher suites use HMAC-SHA-1 as
their Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm. This document
describes sixteen new cipher suites for TLS that specify stronger MAC
algorithms. Eight use Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) with
SHA-256 or SHA-384, and eight use AES in Galois Counter Mode (GCM).
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3.1. HMAC-Based Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3.2. Galois Counter Mode-Based Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Introduction
RFC 4492 [RFC4492] describes Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) cipher
suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS). However, all of the RFC
4492 suites use HMAC-SHA1 as their MAC algorithm. Due to recent
analytic work on SHA-1 [Wang05], the IETF is gradually moving away
from SHA-1 and towards stronger hash algorithms. This document
specifies TLS ECC cipher suites that use SHA-256 and SHA-384 [SHS]
rather than SHA-1.
TLS 1.2 [RFC5246], adds support for authenticated encryption with
additional data (AEAD) cipher modes [RFC5116]. This document also
specifies a set of ECC cipher suites using one such mode, Galois
Counter Mode (GCM) [GCM]. Another document [RFC5288] provides
support for GCM with other key establishment methods.
2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Cipher Suites
This document defines 16 new cipher suites to be added to TLS. All
use Elliptic Curve Cryptography for key exchange and digital
signature, as defined in RFC 4492.
3.1. HMAC-Based Cipher Suites
The first eight cipher suites use AES [AES] in Cipher Block Chaining
(CBC) [CBC] mode with an HMAC-based MAC:
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x23};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x24};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x25};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x26};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x27};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x28};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x29};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x2A};
These eight cipher suites are the same as the corresponding cipher
suites in RFC 4492 (with names ending in "_SHA" in place of "_SHA256"
or "_SHA384"), except for the MAC and Pseudo Random Function (PRF)
algorithms.
These SHALL be as follows:
o For cipher suites ending with _SHA256, the PRF is the TLS PRF
[RFC5246] with SHA-256 as the hash function. The MAC is HMAC
[RFC2104] with SHA-256 as the hash function.
o For cipher suites ending with _SHA384, the PRF is the TLS PRF
[RFC5246] with SHA-384 as the hash function. The MAC is HMAC
[RFC2104] with SHA-384 as the hash function.
3.2. Galois Counter Mode-Based Cipher Suites
The second eight cipher suites use the same asymmetric algorithms as
those in the previous section but use the new authenticated
encryption modes defined in TLS 1.2 with AES in Galois Counter Mode
(GCM) [GCM]:
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x2B};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x2C};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x2D};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x2E};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x2F};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x30};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x31};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x32};
These cipher suites use authenticated encryption with additional data
algorithms AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM described in
[RFC5116]. GCM is used as described in [RFC5288].
The PRFs SHALL be as follows:
o For cipher suites ending with _SHA256, the PRF is the TLS PRF
[RFC5246] with SHA-256 as the hash function.
o For cipher suites ending with _SHA384, the PRF is the TLS PRF
[RFC5246] with SHA-384 as the hash function.
4. Security Considerations
The security considerations in RFC 4346, RFC 4492, and [RFC5288]
apply to this document as well. In addition, as described in
[RFC5288], these cipher suites may only be used with TLS 1.2 or
greater.
5. IANA Considerations
IANA has assigned the following values for these cipher suites:
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x23};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x24};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x25};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x26};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x27};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x28};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x29};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x2A};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x2B};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x2C};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x2D};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x2E};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x2F};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x30};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x31};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x32};
6. Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the US Department of Defense.
David McGrew, Pasi Eronen, and Alfred Hoenes provided reviews of this
document.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492, May 2006.
[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, January 2008.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5288] Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES-GCM Cipher
Suites for TLS", RFC 5288, August 2008.
[AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES)", FIPS 197, November 2001.
[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard", FIPS 180-2, August 2002.
[CBC] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation -
Methods and Techniques", SP 800-38A, December 2001.
[GCM] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for Confidentiality and
Authentication", SP 800-38D, November 2007.
7.2. Informative References
[Wang05] Wang, X., Yin, Y., and H. Yu, "Finding Collisions in the
Full SHA-1", CRYPTO 2005, August 2005.
Author's Address
Eric Rescorla
RTFM, Inc.
2064 Edgewood Drive
Palo Alto 94303
USA
EMail: ekr@rtfm.com
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AI ELI5
On this page
§1Why New ECC Cipher Suites
RFC 4492 describes Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) cipher suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS). All of them use HMAC-SHA1 as their Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm. Because of recent analytic work on SHA-1, the IETF is gradually moving away from SHA-1 and toward stronger hash algorithms.
This document specifies TLS ECC cipher suites that use SHA-256 and SHA-384 instead of SHA-1.
TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) also adds support for authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD) cipher modes (RFC 5116). This document uses one such mode, Galois Counter Mode (GCM), for a second group of ECC suites. RFC 5288 covers GCM with other key establishment methods.
The old locks used a seal that experts were starting to distrust. This document hands out new locks with stronger seals.
§3Sixteen Suites in Two Families
The document defines 16 new cipher suites. All of them use Elliptic Curve Cryptography for key exchange and digital signature, as defined in RFC 4492. In other words, the key exchange and signature parts are unchanged; what changes is how data is protected and which hash is used.
The suites come in two groups of eight. The first group uses AES in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode with an HMAC-based MAC. The second group uses AES in Galois Counter Mode. Within each group, the names show the key exchange (ECDHE or ECDH), the signature or certificate type (ECDSA or RSA), the AES key size (128 or 256) and the hash (SHA256 or SHA384).
There are two boxes of eight locks each. One box uses a chain of linked blocks, the other uses a newer scrambling method.
§3.1The HMAC-Based Suites
The first eight suites use AES in CBC mode with an HMAC-based MAC, for example TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256. They are the same as the corresponding RFC 4492 suites, whose names end in _SHA, except for the MAC and the Pseudo Random Function (PRF).
The RFC says these SHALL be as follows:
- For suites ending
_SHA256, the PRF is the TLS PRF with SHA-256 as the hash function, and the MAC is HMAC (RFC 2104) with SHA-256. - For suites ending
_SHA384, the PRF is the TLS PRF with SHA-384 as the hash function, and the MAC is HMAC with SHA-384.
These are the old locks with a better seal. The only changes are the stamp used to check nothing was tampered with and the recipe for mixing secret numbers.
§3.2The Galois Counter Mode Suites
The second eight suites use the same asymmetric algorithms as the first group, but use the authenticated encryption modes defined in TLS 1.2, with AES in Galois Counter Mode (GCM). An example is TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.
These suites use the AEAD algorithms AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM described in RFC 5116, and GCM is used as described in RFC 5288.
Because AEAD handles integrity itself, only the PRF is specified: for suites ending _SHA256 it is the TLS PRF with SHA-256, and for suites ending _SHA384 it is the TLS PRF with SHA-384.
Here the scrambling and the tamper check happen in one step, like a lock that also has the seal built in. The hash name only picks the recipe for mixing secret numbers.
§4Security Considerations
The security considerations in RFC 4346, RFC 4492 and RFC 5288 apply to this document as well. In addition, as described in RFC 5288, these cipher suites may only be used with TLS 1.2 or greater.
The safety rules for the older locks still apply. These new locks also only work with the newest version of the secure connection.
§5Assigned Cipher Suite Values
IANA has assigned a two-byte value to each of the 16 suites. The HMAC-based suites take values from {0xC0,0x23} to {0xC0,0x2A}, and the GCM-based suites take values from {0xC0,0x2B} to {0xC0,0x32}.
Within each group the order is ECDHE_ECDSA, ECDH_ECDSA, ECDHE_RSA, ECDH_RSA, and for each of these the 128-bit AES and SHA-256 suite comes first, followed by the 256-bit AES and SHA-384 suite.
Each lock gets its own number so that both sides of a connection can say which one they want.
- 0xC0,0x23TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 — AES in CBC mode with HMAC and PRF using SHA-256.
- 0xC0,0x24TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 — AES in CBC mode with HMAC and PRF using SHA-384.
- 0xC0,0x25TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 — AES in CBC mode with HMAC and PRF using SHA-256.
- 0xC0,0x26TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 — AES in CBC mode with HMAC and PRF using SHA-384.
- 0xC0,0x27TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 — AES in CBC mode with HMAC and PRF using SHA-256.
- 0xC0,0x28TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 — AES in CBC mode with HMAC and PRF using SHA-384.
- 0xC0,0x29TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 — AES in CBC mode with HMAC and PRF using SHA-256.
- 0xC0,0x2ATLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 — AES in CBC mode with HMAC and PRF using SHA-384.
- 0xC0,0x2BTLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 — AES in Galois Counter Mode; PRF with SHA-256.
- 0xC0,0x2CTLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 — AES in Galois Counter Mode; PRF with SHA-384.
- 0xC0,0x2DTLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 — AES in Galois Counter Mode; PRF with SHA-256.
- 0xC0,0x2ETLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 — AES in Galois Counter Mode; PRF with SHA-384.
- 0xC0,0x2FTLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 — AES in Galois Counter Mode; PRF with SHA-256.
- 0xC0,0x30TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 — AES in Galois Counter Mode; PRF with SHA-384.
- 0xC0,0x31TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 — AES in Galois Counter Mode; PRF with SHA-256.
- 0xC0,0x32TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 — AES in Galois Counter Mode; PRF with SHA-384.