RFC 4345 HISTORIC SECURITY · ENCRYPTION

SSH Arcfour: Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol

Safer ways to use Arcfour encryption in SSH

On rfc-editor.org ↗
PUBLISHED
January 2006
AUTHORS
B. Harris
STREAM
IETF
KEYSTREAM BYTES DISCARDED
1536
ARCFOUR128 KEY SIZE
128 bits
ARCFOUR256 KEY SIZE
256 bits
DOI
10.17487/RFC4345
ERRATA
Reported errata

RFC text

Contents
Original text · RFC Editor View on rfc-editor.org ↗
Network Working Group                                          B. Harris
Request for Comments: 4345                                  January 2006
Category: Standards Track


                      Improved Arcfour Modes for
            the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol

Status of This Memo

   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

Abstract

   This document specifies methods of using the Arcfour cipher in the
   Secure Shell (SSH) protocol that mitigate the weakness of the
   cipher's key-scheduling algorithm.

1.  Introduction

   Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC4251] is a secure remote-login protocol.  It
   allows for the use of an extensible variety of symmetric cipher
   algorithms to provide confidentiality for data in transit.  One of
   the algorithms specified in the base protocol is "arcfour", which
   specifies the use of Arcfour (also known as RC4), a fast stream
   cipher.  As [RFC4253] says, though, "Arcfour (and RC4) has problems
   with weak keys, and should be used with caution."  These problems are
   described in more detail in [MANTIN01], along with a recommendation
   to discard the first 1536 bytes of keystream so as to ensure that the
   cipher's internal state is thoroughly mixed.  This document specifies
   new cipher algorithms for SSH that follow this recommendation.

2.  Conventions Used in this Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3.  Applicability Statement

   Implementations of Arcfour are typically slightly faster and much
   smaller than those of any other encryption algorithm currently
   defined for SSH.  This must be balanced, though, against the known
   security problems with Arcfour described in Section 5.  In most
   cases, where speed and code size are not critical issues, the
   algorithms specified by [RFC4344] should be used instead.

4.  Algorithm Definitions

   The "arcfour128" algorithm is the RC4 cipher, as described in
   [SCHNEIER], using a 128-bit key.  The first 1536 bytes of keystream
   generated by the cipher MUST be discarded, and the first byte of the
   first encrypted packet MUST be encrypted using the 1537th byte of
   keystream.

   The "arcfour256" algorithm is the same, but uses a 256-bit key.

5.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations in [RFC4251] apply.

   The discarded bytes of keystream MUST be kept secret and MUST NOT be
   transmitted over the network.  The contents of these bytes could
   reveal information about the key.

   There are two classes of attack on Arcfour described in [MIRONOV].
   Strong distinguishers distinguish an Arcfour keystream from
   randomness at the start of the stream and are defended against by the
   algorithm defined in this document.  Weak distinguishers can operate
   on any part of the keystream, and the best ones, described in [FMcG]
   and [MANTIN05], can use data from multiple, different keystreams.  A
   consequence of this is that encrypting the same data (for instance, a
   password) sufficiently many times in separate Arcfour keystreams can
   be sufficient to leak information about it to an adversary.  It is
   thus RECOMMENDED that Arcfour (either in the form described here or
   that described in [RFC4251]) not be used for high-volume password-
   authenticated connections.

6.  IANA Considerations

   The IANA has assigned the Encryption Algorithm Names "arcfour128" and
   "arcfour256" in accordance with [RFC4250].

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4250]  Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Protocol Assigned Numbers", RFC 4250, January 2006.

   [RFC4251]  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Protocol Architecture", RFC 4251, January 2006.

   [RFC4253]  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Transport Layer Protocol", RFC 4253, January 2006

   [RFC4344]  Bellare, M., Kohno, T., and C. Namprempre, "The Secure
              Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes", RFC 4344,
              January 2006.

   [SCHNEIER] Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography Second Edition:
              protocols algorithms and source in code in C", John Wiley
              and Sons, New York, NY, 1996.

7.2.  Informative References

   [FMcG]     Fluhrer, S. and D. McGrew, "Statistical Analysis of the
              Alleged RC4 Keystream Generator", Fast Software
              Encryption:  7th International Workshop, FSE 2000, April
              2000, <http://www.mindspring.com/~dmcgrew/rc4-03.pdf>.

   [MANTIN01] Mantin, I., "Analysis of the Stream Cipher RC4", M.Sc.
              Thesis, Weizmann Institute of Science, 2001, <http://
              www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~itsik/RC4/Papers/Mantin1.zip>.

   [MIRONOV]  Mironov, I., "(Not So) Random Shuffles of RC4", Advances
              in Cryptology -- CRYPTO 2002: 22nd Annual International
              Cryptology Conference, August 2002,
              <http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/067.pdf>.

   [MANTIN05] Mantin, I., "Predicting and Distinguishing Attacks on RC4
              Keystream Generator", Advances in Cryptology -- EUROCRYPT
              2005: 24th Annual International Conference on the Theory
              and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, May 2005.

Author's Address

   Ben Harris
   2a Eachard Road
   CAMBRIDGE
   CB3 0HY
   UNITED KINGDOM

   EMail: bjh21@bjh21.me.uk

Trademark Notice

   "RC4" and "SSH" are registered trademarks in the United States.

Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

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AI ELI5

On this page
PROBLEMThe Arcfour (RC4) cipher used in SSH has known weaknesses in its key-scheduling algorithm that can leak information about the key.
MECHANISMRFC 4345 defines two new SSH cipher modes, arcfour128 and arcfour256, that discard the first 1536 bytes of keystream output to eliminate weak initial states that attackers can exploit.
NOW DEPRECATED FOR SECURITYThese improved modes made Arcfour safer for SSH but are now historic as Arcfour itself has been deprecated in favor of stronger ciphers like AES.

§1Introduction

Arcfour (also called RC4) is a fast stream cipher used in SSH to encrypt transmitted data. However, Arcfour has known problems: its key-scheduling algorithm can produce weak initial states that leak information about the key to attackers. Researchers found that discarding the first 1536 bytes of keystream prevents these attacks on the initial state.

Arcfour is fast but its first part is weak. Throwing away the first 1536 bytes of scrambled data makes it much harder to attack.

§2Improved Modes

RFC 4345 specifies two new SSH cipher algorithms: arcfour128 uses Arcfour with a 128-bit key, and arcfour256 uses a 256-bit key. Both algorithms MUST discard the first 1536 bytes of keystream output. The first byte of data encryption uses the 1537th byte of keystream, not the first byte.

These modes remain fast and have small implementations, advantages over other encryption algorithms, but should only be used when speed and code size are critical and stronger alternatives are unavailable.

The two new modes are called arcfour128 and arcfour256. Each one throws away the weak part, then uses the rest normally. They are still fast but safer than before.

§3Historic Status

RFC 4345 is now Historic. Arcfour has been deprecated in SSH due to additional weaknesses discovered after publication. Modern SSH implementations use stronger ciphers like AES, which offer better security guarantees. These improved modes made Arcfour safer for their time but cannot be considered secure by modern standards.

Better scramblers were invented, so Arcfour (even the improved version) is no longer used.

§4References